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I. INTRODUCTION 
It has never been seriously suggested by any Governmer1.t in New 
Zealand that the private hospital sector should be abolished 
or even discouraged. During the last two decades, State policy 
has become increasingly more favourable towards private 
hospitals through the provision of patient benefits, capital 
grants and loans and taxation con.cessions for private hospital 
insurance. 
At 1st April 1974, New Zealand had 351 hospitals of which 197 
were public hospitals containing 17, 839 hospital beds 
(approximately 81 percent of the total hospital beds). (l) The 
public hospitals are administered by formally autonomous 
Hospital Boards which are legally responsible for the detailed 
administration of the h6spitals in their areas. The finances 
of these hospitals are provided almost entirely by the 
Department of Health. In the public hospitals, the medical 
and surgical services are provided largely by part time staff, 
who also have private practices, and a number of full time 
salaried staff. 
There were also 154 private hospitals containing 4,264 hospital 
beds. These can be divided into three main groups - namely, 
matern.i ty, medical only and medical and surgical - all of 
which are subject to inspection for license by the Department 
f H 1th t th t h . h t d d . . t · d (
2 ) o ea o ensure a a ig s an ar is main aine . 
The large public hospitals provide a number of services which 
I 
are not provided by private hospitals, however private 
hospitals carry out all routine medical and surgical treatment 
(1) NeLv Zealand Official Year Book 191.5., Govt. Printer 
Wellington 1975 pp.144-47. 
( 2 ) Part V. Hospi tal9 Ac tAJ/t~AMV 
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in.eluding major surgery, except that requiring teamL<1ork or 
exten.ded hospitalisation. It appears that approximately JO 
percent of all operations performed in New Zealand are 
carried out in private hospitals.(J) 
It was hardly surprising therefore that the Woodhouse Report 
on Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand (
4 ) should 
state: 
.•. the use of private hospitals should be encouraged 
if this could avoid delays in treatment and promote 
the general purpose of rehabilitation ... we are left 
in no doubt that the importance of getting people 
well and back to productive work far outweighs (both 
financially and in human terms) the ostensible 
economic advantage of using the public hospital bed. 
Following this recommendation, the legislature , in providing 
for the payment of the costs of medical treatment under the 
Accident Compensation Act 1972 (hereafter called the Act), made 
the Accident Compensation Commission liable (other factors 
considered) for the payment of private hospital fees under 
section 111 (1). 
The Relationship Between the Provisions in Section 11LJLJ 
Section 111 (1) of the Act provides that: 
(3) 
(4) 
--------------·---------
Board of Health Committee, Private Hospitals in New 
Zealand, Govt. Printer, We llin.gton 1974 p.lJ. 
Royal Commission of In quiry in.to Compensation for Personal 
Injury in New Zealand, Report, Govt. Printer, Wellington 
1967 p.159. 
See also, A Commentarr._Qi]_t he Report of the Ro~Commission of 
];nquiry into Comp ensati on for Personal Injury in New Zea l and . 
Govt. Printer, Wellington 1969 p.107; Select Committee on 
Compensation for Person.al Injury in New Zealand , Report. Govt. 
Printer, Wellington 1972 p. 28 . 
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Subject to any regulations made under this Act, where 
a person suffers personal injury by accident, in respect 
of which he has cover un~er the Act, if as a result of 
the personal injury he requires to obtain a medical 
certificate for the purposes of this Act, or requires 
any treatment to which this subsection applies, the 
Commission shall pay the cost thereof so far as -
(a) That person is not entitled to any benefit 
under Part II of the Social Security Act 
1964 in respect thereof; and 
(b) The Commission considers that the amount 
to be paid by it is reasonable by New Zealand 
standards ... 
Subsection (2)(a) of section 111 (by reference to the definition 
of "hospital" in section 88 of the Social Secu.rity Act 1964) 
provides that subsection (1) of section 111 shall apply to the 
treatment of the injured person in both pu.blic and private 
hospitals. 
Under section 111 (l)(a) the Commission has a direction to pay 
the costs of medical treatment so far as "That person is not 
entitled to any benefit under Part II of the Social Secu.rity 
Act 1964 in. respect thereof''. The basic qualification for 
entitlement to receive hospital and medical benefits u.nder 
those provisions is laid down in section 91 of the Social 
Security Act and is as follows: 
(a) Age over 16 years; and 
(b) Ordinarily resident in New Zealand . (This second 
qualification extends to New Zealand citizens who 
are for the iime being in New Zealand, althou.gh 
ordinarily resident overseas, and who have at some 
previous time been ordinarily resident in New 
Zealand ). 
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A person who can show entitlement is able to claim hospital 
and medical benefits for himself and every member of his 
family under 16 years of age. 
All medical and s .urgical treatment and nursing care and 
attendance afforded in any hospital to a person being maintained 
in the hospital for the purpose of receiving medical or surgical 
treatment therein qualifies for the payment of a hospital 
benefit. 
Benefits as such are no longer paid to public hospitals for 
treatment of patients as this expenditure is included in the 
general expenditure of public hospitals. Section 101 of the 
Social Security Act provides that: 
... no Hospital Board shall demand or accept or be 
entitled to recover from the patient or any other 
person any payment for hospital treatment afforded 
to a hospital patient who is entitled to receive 
hospital benefits 
In other words, when a patient is entitled to hospital benefits 
under the Social Security Act, treatment is provided free by 
public hospitals. 
A hospital benefit is paid on a daily basis for each category 
of patient ac c omoda ted in. a private hospital. The licensee is 
required to apply this payment in red u.ction. of the total 
charges for hospital treatment. (5) 
The benefit rates from 1st October 1975 are as follows: ( 6 ) 
(5) Section 102 (2 ) Social Security Act 1964. 
( 6 ) New Zealand Official Year Book 1976. Govt. Printer 
Wellington 1976. p.1J9. 
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(a) For surgical treatment $12 a day, with a minimum of $24. 
(b) For medical (including psychiatric) treatment $ 9 a day 
(from 1st January 1976). 
(c) For geriatric treatment $11 a day (from 1st January 1976). 
(d) Hospital treatment for maternity patients $12 a day. 
These benefits are paid in respect of the hospital treatment 
only . A surgeon who attends on a patient in a private hospital 
will render his ovm bill of costs separately and there will be an 
entitlement to the specialist medical services benefit under 
section 97 of the Social Security Act. The attendance of an 
anaesthetist carries an entitlement to a general medical benefit 
under section 9J and section 9JA of t he Social Security Act. 
The differences between the public and private sectors in this 
area has obvious implications for the operation of section 
111 (1) (b) of the Act. Un.der this provision the Commission is 
liable for the excess costs beyond the hospital and medical 
benefits so far as "The Commission considers that the amount to 
be paid by it is reasonable by New Zealand standards". Where 
the patient has been treated in a public hospital there is no 
liability on the Commission at all because the whole cost is met 
by the Health Department . However the hospital benefit for 
private hospitals leaves the Commission with an area of liability 
which it is bound to meet unless it considers that the amount 
to be paid by it is unreasonable by New Zealand standards. Also, 
where treatment is obtained in private hospitals the Commission 
i s 1 i a b 1 e u n.d er subsection ( 2 ) ( a ) of section 111 for that part 
of the specialist's a~d an aesthetist's bill not covered by the 
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respective benefits. 
DefiniQ_g_the Issue 
It is the discretion which the Cqmmission has unjer section 
111 (l)(b) to meet the casts of private hospital treatment which 
is the s~bject of this paper. Four main areas will be considered, 
each of which concerns in one way or another the policy which the 
Commission follows in exercising that discretion. 
The way in which the Commission has formulated and applied its 
policy will be the general theme throughout the paper . The basic 
policy which the Comnission follows is set out in the Acci~~Q~ 
Co!!!.P_ensation_Medical Handbook(?) but, as the Commission itself 
stresses and as practice shows, this is intended to be a guideli~e 
only. The paper will indicate how the Commission has supplemented 
this basic policy with memoranda arid technical in.form9.tion 
circulars where a particular situation has warranted special 
consideration. 
After examining the policy as it is set out in. the Medi£al 
Hag.9,_boQ.t, the p9.per will consider the administrative law aspects 
of the discretion and the validity of the Commission's policy 
formulation in the light of these considerations. Basically 
two related questions will be considered here: the fettering 
of discretion by self-created rules of policy; and, the abuse of 
discretion by taking into account irrelevant considerations. 
There will be an examindtion of how the Commission's policy has 
been applied in practice. This will involve a review of relevant 
decisio~s both by the Hearing Officers at the Review Hearings 
(?) Accident Compensation Commission, Accident Compensa~ 
Med~ca]:_Ii..~ndbook 1974 pp.14-16. 
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and by the Appeal Authority on appeal. 
Finally the paper will consider particular problem areas which 
the commission has had to deal with in the application of its 
policy. Three basic issues will be looked at: the question of 
the amount to be paid under section 111 (l)(b) and how this 
relates to private medical insurance; the medical profession 
and its relationship and interaction with the Commission; the 
Auckland geriatric patient problem. 
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II. THE POLICY GUIDELINES -------------------
It was clear from the way in which the Commission's liability 
for hospital treatment under section 111 had baen enacted with 
reference to Part II of the Soc:ial Security Act, that Government 
policy was that Government funds (through the Department of 
Health) should pay for the public hospital treatment of accident 
victims. It was considered that the extra cost to the hospital 
system (compared with the recoveries they previously made from 
i nsuran.ce companies) would be largely balanced by the saving to 
Government funds as a result of the Commission paying for what 
previously the Social Security Department paid out in sickness 
and ihvalidity benefits to accidentally injured people. 
It was, therefore, decided that the funds which citizens 
contributed to the Commission were to be calculated on the b~sis 
that the public hospital system would be the point of first 
referral for an accident victim requiring hospital attention. 
It was felt that, sinc:e the populace of New Zealand had already 
provided, through taxation, for the full maintenance of the 
public hospital system and for some subsidy for private 
hospital treatment, it would not b,e appropriate that in normal 
cases the citizen should pay (through Accident Compensation 
levies) an additional amount to provide the full cost of private 
hospital treatment where adequate personnel and facilities 
were available at a public hospital. 
Nevertheless, the Commi&sion accepted, with the make up of New 
Zealand's health system being as it was, that the private 
sector had a necessary part to play in those services, and that, 
in appropriate cases, some p~rtion of its funds should be 
available for the payment of the costs for private hospital 
treatment. 
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Accordingly, the Commission formulated a set of policy guidelines 
to be used as a point of reference, in each case where the 
paym9nt of costs for private hospital treatment was in issue, 
as an aid to determining whether or not the particular case was 
an appropriate one for s~ch fees to be paid. These guidelines 
are set out in the Accident C~~n.sation Medic.al Handbook, which 
was issued by the Commission in 19?4 for the information of 
medical practitioners and other interested parties on. particular 
areas of the Act which were open to interpretation. 
The Commission. emphasises in the Handbook that its policy is 
intended to be "flexible and co-operative, the welfare of the 
patient being regarded as paramount''. (
8 ) However, because it 
has a responsibility for "the best economic and social use of 
public funds", tha Commission points out t hat it cannot undertake 
to meet the cost of private hospital treatment , with accompanying 
specialist medical fees, in every case whsre the patient or his 
do~tor might wish it. 
The Commission recognises that it should not interfere with tha 
traditional doctor-patient relationship and that tha responsibility 
for the clinical management of an. accident pa tien.t' s medical 
treatment, including any decision to enter a public or private 
hospital, must be the concern of the do~tor and the patient 
themselves. However the Commission and their agents (the State 
In.surance Office Managers) alone have the authority to accept 
the financial responsibility for private hospital treatment where 
the injured person has chosen to enter a private hospital. 
Medical practitioners are not authorised to commit the Commission 
(8) ibid 16. 
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to acceptance of such costs. In view of this, the Commission 
recommends that: ( 9 ) 
The Commission's acceptance of financial responsibility 
should be obtained in advance of any proposed private 
hospital treatment. Such advance acceptance does not 
have to be obtained but if it is not, the patient 
faces the risk that the Commission may not later agree. 
The financial responsibility would then be that of the 
patient. An in.formal ad van.ce approach to the Commission 
I s 
local claims-handling Agent would therefore be desirable 
and in the patient I s o ;,vn interests. However, an 
exception could be made in the case where urgent treatment, 
which could only be obtained in a private hospital , does 
not allow sufficient time to obtain Commission approval. 
Bearing in mind that it has no liability at all to meet the 
costs of public hospital treatment, the Commission has listed a 
number of factors by which it could be influenced in makin g its 
decision on the amount (if ar-1y) it considers reasonable to pay 
in cases where the injured person has received treatment in a 
private hospital. These are: (lO) 
(a) The Act I s emphasis on. rehabilitation of the in.j ured. 
(b) The overall economics of the compensation scheme, 
which might become distorted if disproportionate 
expenditure were incurred for private hospital 
treatment. 
(c) The economics of the particular case. The Commission 
will consider: 
(i) The actual cost of the private hospital treatment. 
(ii) The comparison between that cost on ths one hand 
and, on the other, the overall cost to the 
Commission if compensation p3.yments would have 
--------------------------
(9) idem. 
(10) ibid 15-'16. 
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to run for a longer time because admission to 
public hospital could not soon be arranged. Even 
if this comparison still shows that private 
hospital treatment will involve greater cost, that 
cost could still be regarded as reasonable by the 
Commission if the private hospital treatment would 
result in. rehabilitation of the patient being 
materially and substantially advanced, so that the 
greater cost is outweighed by the benefits to the 
patient. 
(d) Any factors of public interest such as the desirability 
of retaining and attracting adequate medical services. 
(e) The extent and quality of professional services and 
general facilities available at hospitals in the area. 
(f) The convenience of the patient and his family. 
(g) The emergency nature of any treatment required and 
the location of available facilities. 
(h) The opinion of the patient 's medical advisers on the 
above or any other relevant factors. 
The Commission makes it clear that it could not normally be 
expected to meet the costs of private hospital treatment if the 
patient's stay in the private hospital is likely to exceed ten 
days or if proper treatment in a public hospital were available 
immediately or within a reasonable time. 
The existence of these policy guidelines not only serves as an 
indication to the medical practitioner and his patien.t of what 
the Commission's attitude is to the question of its liability 
to meet the costs of private hospital treatment, but also 
facilitates a certain degree of uniformity and consistency in 
the exercise of the dispretion under section 111 at three main 
levels: (ll) first, where prior approval of the Commission is 
(11) The Managers of the State Insurance Office and the Hearing 
Officers can exercise such of the functions and powers of the 
Commission as are delegated to them in. accordance with 
section 29 of the Act. 
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being sought to incur the costs of private hospital treatment; 
secondly, where prior approva l has not been obtained but where 
a claim for the costs is being made through the State Insurance 
Office; thirdly, where such a claim has been refused at the 
initial stage and the question is being considered by a Hearing 
Officer at the Review Hearing. 
The formulation of such a policy is in accordance with the ability 
of all governmen.t departments to make rules whi eh are not 
in.consistent with the relevan.t Act an.d Regulations (assuming at 
this stage that the Commission's policy guidelines are not 
inconsistent with the Act or any Regulations made under the Act). 
In the Social Welfare Department, for example, un.iform policies 
and procedures throughout the district offices are ensured by 
reference to the depa rtmental manuals which incorpora te 
instructions of the Social Security Commission and rules of 
guidance. 
However there is a significant difference between the Commission's 
Medical Handbook and the manuals of other govern.ment departments 
such as Social Welfare. Access to departmental manuals is 
invariably limited to authorised officers of the department. 
Given that extensive recourse is had to these manuals particularly 
in the whole context of the exercise of discretion, the effect is 
that decisions affecting benefit applicants and beneficiaries, 
for example, are made according to "secret law" and there is no 
opportunity for challenge on such grounds as excess or abuse of 
\ 
discretion.. On the other hand, the _!iedic§;J_Handbook and the 
policy guidelines therein are freely accessible to any interested 
persons and this makes the possibility of making a successful 
challenge much greater. It is this· question which the paper now 
considers. 
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III. FETTERING OF DISCRETION BY_SELF-CREATED_RULES OF POLICY 
De 3mith states the general proposition that: 11 A Tribu.nal 
entru.sted with a discretion mu.st not, by the adoption of a fixed 
ru.le of policy, disable itself from exercising its discretion in 
individual cases. 11 (1 2 ) 
The relevant principles were stated in R v Port of London 
Au.thority, E~rte K;ynoch Ltd. (lJ) In that case the owners of 
land adjoining the river Thames wished to construct a deep-water 
wharf . The Port of London Au.thority refu.sed permission on the 
grou.nd that Parliament had charged the Authority itself ~Ji th the 
du.ty of providing su.ch facilities. It appeared that, before 
reaching its decision, the Au.thority had fu.lly considered the 
case on its merits and in relation to the public interest and 
the decision was therefore u.pheld. 
. ( 14) 
Bankes L.J. said: 
( 12) 
( 13) 
(14) 
There are on. the one hand cases where a tribunal in the 
honest exercise of its discretion had adopted a policy, 
and, wi thou.t refu.sing to hear an. applicant, intimates to 
him what its policy is, and that after hearing him it will 
in accordance with its policy decide against him, u.nless 
there is something exceptional in his case ... if the policy 
has been adopted for reasons which the tribunal may 
legitimately entertain, no objection cou.ld be taken to such 
a cou.rse. On the other hand there are cases where a 
tribunal has passed a rule, or come to a determination, not 
to hear any application of a particu.lar character by 
whomsoever made. There is a wide distinction to be drawn 
between these two classes. 
S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
( Jrd ed. 197 J J p.77tr." · 
[1919] 1 K.B. 176. 
ibid 184. 
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An. earlier New lealand case, _!sitt2_2.gil1, (l 5 ) had intimated 
at a similar con.clusion. That case involved the Sydenham 
Licensing Committee's refusal to renew the licenses of all 
eight licensed houses in the district. The Committee was 
dominated by prohibitionists who had pledged, on their election, 
to close all the hotels and public houses under their 
jurisdiction. The Court found that the majority of the 
Committee were in.capable, through bias, of exercising a judicial 
discretion in determining whether the licenses were required in 
the neighbourhood. 
Williams J. however considered that the question before the Court 
was one of fact: (l 6 ) 
Have the appellants laid down an arbitrary rule by which 
their action was to be govern.ed, and ha ve they foJJmved 
that rule? Have they ... expressed and acted upon a 
general intention with regard to all licenses, whereas 
it was their duty to consider each individual case on its 
own special merits. If they have, then, although there 
was a necessity of a separate hearing in each case, the 
appellants have not really exercised their discretion, 
and this Court should interfere. 
In Franklin v Minister of Town and Countri Planning(l?) the House 
of Lords held that it was enough that the Minister had genuinely 
considered the report and objections to a new town designation 
and in exercising his discretion the Minister could have in mind 
such factors as the policy of the party to which he belonged. 
(15) (1893) 11 N.Z.L.R. 224. 
(16) ibid 256. 
(17) [1948] A.C. 87, 104-5. 
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In the recent case of British Oxygen v Minister of Technology(lS) 
the House of Lords again considered the principles of law involved 
in the fettering of a discretion. Lord Reid said in that 
case: (l 9 ) 
The general rule is that anyone who has to exercise a 
statutory discretion must not "shut (his) ears to the 
application (to quote from Bankes L.J. [in Kynoch's case]). 
I do not think that there is any great difference bet~-.Jeen 
a policy and a rule. There may be cases where an officer 
or authority ought to listen to a substantial argument 
reasonably presented arguing a change of policy. What 
the authority must not do is to refuse to listen at all. 
But a Ministry or large authority may have had to deal 
already with a multitude of similar applications and then 
they will almost certainly have evolved a policy so precise 
that it could well be called a rule. There can be no 
objection to that provided the authority is always willing 
to listen to anyone with something new to say 
The principle enunciated in the British Oxygen case was accepted in 
Sagnata Investments Ltd. v Norwich Co_Eporation. (2 O) In that case 
the local authority had adopted a general policy not to permit 
amusement arcades in their City. The applicant, who had had his 
request for a permit turned down by the authority, appealed to 
quarter sessions where the recorder found that it was open to 
the local authority to adopt the general policy of refusing such 
applications provided that no inflexible, unvarying attitude was 
adopted and that the local authority was prepared to depart from 
it where the justice of the particular case so required. However 
on the evidence before him the recorder concluded: ( 2l) 
(18) [1971] A.G. 610; [1970] J All E.R. 165. 
(19) ibid 624; ibid 170. 
(20) [1971] 2 Q.B. 614 (C.A. ). 
(21) Reported in [1971] 2 Q.B. 614, at 6J2-JJ. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON .. -. .. -- _,,, --
16. 
in this case, where the application met with all the 
ordinary requirements as to suitability of site, premises 
and management, the general policy must have applied. In 
other words, no application to the local authority, 
however suitable, would succeed . . . . In my vie1v (and 
[counsel for the local authority] virtually conceded 
this), the licensing committee have decided that they will 
not grant a permit for any amusement place with prizes in 
the City of Norwich, and the reasons they give for this 
refusal would apply to any application. 
Having reached this conclusion, the recorder approached the 
matter Q~ovo and "with a complete and unfettered discretion'' 
and decided in favour of the applicants . From that decision the 
local authority applied by case stated to the Divisional Court 
who upheld the decision of the recorder. 
In the Court of Appeal, (22 ) Edmund Davies and Phillimore L.JJ 
agreed with the conclusion of the recorder on the question of 
local authority 1 s application of its general policy . Phillimore 
L.J. said:( 2 J) 
In other words the council had not exercised any form of 
discretion.. They had simply dismissed this application 
after going through the necessary motions without regard 
to its individual merits or demerits. I take this to be 
a finding of fact with which this Court is in no position 
to interfere .... This is a case where the recorder 
was satisfied that the council 1 s committee had failed to 
keep an open mind an.d had applied their policy v-ii thout 
regard to the facts of the individual case . 
(22) [1971] 2 Q, B. 614 . 
( 2J) ibid 639; see also ibid 6J2-JJ per Edmund Davies L.J. 
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Lord Denning M.R. in his dissenting judgment, while agreeing 
with the general principle in the British Oxygen case, reached a 
different conclusion on the facts . He said: (
24 ) 
... it is apparent that, although the city council laid 
down a general policy, the licensing committee did not 
regard that policy as inflexible or as binding on them: 
that they listened to everything that the applicants had 
to say: and yet decided against them 
... [The recorder] acknowledges that the policy was 
fairly and honestly formed and was a reasonable policy. 
If so, the local authority were entitled to have the 
policy and to apply it in this individLJ.al case, provided 
that they listened to all the applicant had to say -
which they clearly did. 
It becomes apparent from these cases that where the Courts 
have been concerned to determine whether a tribunal type body 
has unlawfully fettered its discretion, it has been concerned 
with the actual state of mind rather than appearances. (
2 5) 
(24) 
(25) 
ibid 627. 
In this respect the question of fettering of discretion is 
different from the question of bias. In the latter case, 
the question generally is as to whether the members of the 
tribunal have so conducted themselves as to lead other 
persons to believe that there is a real possibility of the 
tribunal having predetermined matters in issue before it. 
The requirement of justice not only bein,g done but appearing 
to be done is important in the context of bias: see e.g. 
R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 K.B. 256 . 
S.A. de Smith, supra n.12 p.218 
It appears therefore that the fettering of discretion 
question is a harder one to make out than the bias question. 
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In a recent New Zealand case, Hamilton Ci~ Electricity 
Distribution Commission, ( 26 ) Richmond J. in the Su.preme Court 
faced with determining whether the Commission had fettered its 
discretion by adopting preconceived principles. The Commission 
proposed to constitu.te an electricity au.thority to administer 
the su.pply and distribu.tion of electricity in the Waikato Area 
Electric Supply District. The proposal entailed the merger of 
the plaintiff, which was an existing su.pply authority, with five 
other power boards in the area to form the new au.thority. This 
meant the revocation of the existing electric line licenses of 
the merging su.pply authorities. 
The plaintiffs challenged the validity of the proposal on the 
grou.nd that the Commission had fettered its discretion before 
initiating the proposal. Richmond J. said: (27 ) 
When it comes to questions of fettering a discretion, 
however, I believe that the Cou.rt is concerned to ascertain 
the reality of the position rather than the inference 
which people cou.ld reasonably draw from the con.du.et of 
members of the tribunal .... This approach to the matter 
is, I believe correct in principle becau.se the basic 
qu.estion mu.st always be whether in the exercise of a 
particu.lar discretion the person or body entrusted with 
the discretion exercised it in a real and genuine sense. 
In the context of the present case the qu.estion is - had 
the Commission in fact retained the capacity to apply 
itself genuinely to the particu.lar problems which arose 
in the Waikato. This problem is one of an actual state 
of mind rather than of .§1212earance~. 
( 26 ) [1972] N.Z.L.R. 605. 
(27) ibid 6JB-J9 (emphasis added ). 
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The learned Judge was of the view that the Commission was 
entitled to carry out widespread investigatio~s throughout New 
Zealand and to form views as to the desirability of reorganisation. 
of electrical supply distribution in individual localities. 
After considering the House of Lords decision i~ the British 
.Q.!Y_gen case, Richmond J. concluded: (28 ) 
I see nothing legally wrong with the Commission having 
given serious consideration to the best way of solving 
these problems , in. a general sense , and in. arriving at 
firm opinions as to what ought, as a matter of general 
principle, to be done ... 
I can see no objection to the Commission bringing to 
the task of initiating a particular proposal the 
benefit of its own previous thinking as to the best 
policy to be followed in meeting a particular problem 
of widespread recurrence throughout the country. In 
my opinion it need do no more than give genuine 
consideration to the question whether the particular 
problem in the locality is in fact of a kind which 
falls fairly within the category of case to which the 
Commission's earlier thinking was directed. 
It appears therefore that the Accident Compensation Commission 
has not unlawfully fettered its discretion merely by formulating 
a preconceived policy to determine its liability to meet the 
costs of private hospital treatment . In one sense the type of 
situation which exists here is in contrast with the type of 
situation which the Courts were concerned with in cases like 
Hamilton City , Sagnata Investments an.d Isitt for example, where 
the respective tribunals had a deliberate fixed policy such as 
"municipal authorities should not distribute electricity", or 
( 28 ) ibid 634-JS. 
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"no amusement arcades will be permitted 11 , or "no liquor 
licenses will be granted or renewed''. As far as the Commission 
is concerned however, there is no general policy that private 
hospital fees will not be paid at all. On the contrary, the 
guidelines in the Medical Handbook have been formulated on the 
basis that there are appropriate cases where the cost of private 
hospital treatment should be met out of the Commission's 
funds. 
As Blair J. ( the Appeal Authority) has said, 11 obviously the 
Commission must deal with each case on its merits'', ( 29 ) and the 
analysis, undertaken later in this paper, of the Commission's 
interpretation and application of its policy indicates that it 
is far from being rigid and inflexible in its approach - it 
does not "shut its ears" to any claim. 
(29) Re Turner (1976) 1 N.Z.A.R. 7, 11. Accident Compensation 
Appeal Authority Decision No 6. 
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IV . THE EXERCISE OF A DISCRETIONARY POWER ON IRRELEVANT GROUNDS 
Although the Commission may not have unlm.Jfully fettered its 
discretion by formulating a preconceived policy, that policy 
must not be based on considerations extraneous to those 
contemplated by the enabling Act , otherwise it has exercised its 
discretion by taking irrelevant considerations into account. ( JO ) 
The established princip l e of law upon which a statutory 
discretion must be exercised was set out by Lord Greene M.R. in 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation. ( 3. 
His Lordship said: (32 ) 
. .. a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to 
speak , direct himself properly in law. He must call 
his own attention to the matters which he is bound 
to consider . He must exclude from his consideration 
matters which are irrelevant to what he has to 
consider. 
( 33 ) 
In F l 1;1.n.agan v D. C. C., the Coun.cil had passed a resolution 
that taxi licenses would not be granted to deserters. The Court 
he l d that the Council was entit l ed to lay down general rules for 
guidance in dealing with applications, but that such rules must 
be re l ated to the merits of the application . As the rule in 
this case was not so related it was held to be invalid . 
Predetermined rules of policy were examined in Attorney General v 
Car Haulaways (N.Z .) Ltd. (
34 ) The Court of Appeal held that the 
Transport Licensing Appeal Authority , in basing its decision on 
a predetermined policy that a n.ewcomer must make out a strong 
case 
( JO ) 
(31 ) 
(32 ) 
(33 ) 
before it could be licensed to compete with an established 
S . A. de Smith , supr~ n . 12 p . 297 . 
[1948] 1 K. B . 223; se also Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd 
[1975] 2 N. Z . L . R . 62, 67 - 68 . 
ibid 229 . 
(1920 ) N. Z . L . R. 713 . ( 34 ) [1974] 2 N. Z . L . R. 331 (C. A.) 
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operator over the same route, was acting within its 
jurisdiction.(35) If the policy had been ultra vires the 
empowering Act then the Authority would have abused its 
discretionary power to grant transport licenses by failing 
to exercise it in accordance with its empowering instrument. 
The general proposition is well stated by Richmond J. in 
Hamil ton City v Electricity Distribution Commission: (3
6 ) 
It is, however, quite clear in the light of the British 
Oxy~ case that there is in general no legal objection 
to an .administrative body formulating a general rule of 
policy, ~rovided, of course, that th~rticular 
discretion in. question is not qualified in some~ 
which would .£.£event the formulation of such a rule. 
The argument made in respect to the Commission's policy as set 
out in the Medical Handbook is that, while the Commission has a 
discretion under section 111 (l)(b) to consider whether any 
amount to be paid is reasonable in regard to the services 
rendered nevertheless, the incidence of cost can bear no 
relevance to whether it is reasonable - that is, the amount to 
be paid can be no more or less reasonable because it is paid from 
one public fund rather than another. In other words, the 
argument is that the Commission should only be concerned with 
the actual monetary amount which is claimed and the only 
question which the Commission should ask itself is: Is the 
amount claimed a reasonable amount by New Zealand standards 
for the treatment given? If the answer is "Yes", then the 
Commission is liable to meet those costs under section 111 (l)(b). 
(35) ibid 337-38. 
(36) [1972] N.Z.L.R. 605, 634 (emphasis added). 
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Any consideration of other factors such as those set out in the 
Medical Handbook, it is argued, are ultra vires the Act and the 
Commission is therefore guilty of abusing its statutory 
discretion if it takes them into account. 
This argument was made by counsel for the applicant in Re Manthel (J?) 
when. the case came before the Appeal Authority. Blair J., after 
considering the Commission. 1 s policy, said: (J5 ) 
It is unnecessary to state that regulations made under 
the statute must be intra vires the statute and of course 
the same rule applies to any informal exposition or 
explanation of the policy which the Commission proposes 
to follow in administering the section such as contained 
in the Medical Handbook. Such a policy statement can go 
so far but no further than it is authorised to go by the 
governing statute. 
The learned Judge went on to say that if counsel 1 s submission 
was right then the Commission's stated policy to limit its 
financial responsibility to those patients who seek private 
hospital treatment is wrong. He thought however that this would 
be so only if section. 111 1,1ere to be read literally and in 
isolation and Blair J., applying the ordinary rules of statutory 
interpretation,( 39 ) considered that the statutory language had 
to be read in context. 
Since section 111 is made "subject to any regulations under the 
Act", Blair J. thought it relevant to turn to section. 181 (1) 
para. (1). Section 181 (1) empowers the making of regulations 
(J?) 
(JS) 
(J9) 
Re Manthel (1976) 1 N.Z.A.R. 69. Accident Compensation Appeal 
Authority Decision No 15. 
See also Review Hearin2 s: No ?4/ROOJJ4; No 75/ROJJ6. 
ibid 70. 
Maxvrnll on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th ed. 1969) 
p.47 and 58. 
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for various purposes and para. (1) of that subsection states that 
regulations can be made: 
Prescribing the circumstances in which, the extent to 
which and the method by which the Commission shall, in 
accordance with section 111 of this Act, pay the cost 
of treatments ... in respect of which payments are to 
be made under that section ... 
Accordingly, Blair J. considered that: (4 o) 
... the words in the paragraph contemplate that in 
deciding upon the reasonableness of the charges the 
Commissio n can have regard to the circumstances in 
which they were incurred and this would include 
deciding, in each case, whether it was reasonable 
for the patient to prefer the private hospital system 
to that of the public. Such a decision would be 
made in the light of the Commission's knowledge of 
the structure of hospital services in this country 
and it can be assumed that Parliament, in enacting 
the Accident Compensation Act would be aware also of 
this structure and the necessity for the Commission 
or some like authority to have some control over the 
respective weight which the public and private 
hospital systems would bear in caring for accident 
victims. The point I am making is that the 
"circumstances" for the Commission to have regard to 
would include the background hospital situation in 
New Zealand and the need to control the flow of 
accident cases into different arms of the hospital 
service. I think that s. 181 authorises the making 
of regulations to do this. Though no regulations 
have been made the Commission has in fact formulated 
a policy which seems to me to conform with para. (1) 
(40) (197 6 ) 1 N.Z.A.R. 69, 71. 
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in that it sets out the circumstances in which it will 
pay hospital charges. If I am right in utilising s. 181 
as an aid to the interpretation of s. 111 the 
Commission is entitled to apply that section in the way 
it did in this case. 
With respect, it is not clear what the learned Judge is saying 
here. It appears that there are two possible interpretations 
of his reasoning. The first is that Blair J. is reading the 
words in section 111 in the context of the unexercised 
regulation.-making power relating to them in section. 181. As one 
commentator(4l) has suggested, this approach would have 
11 serious implications 11 • It amounts to a proposition that a 
policy which could have been promulgated in regulations can be 
held to be valid, even though no such regulatio~s have been made, 
on the ground that these regulations could have been made. This 
somewhat circular argument is clearly untenable. The effect of 
this proposition is that the policy set out in the Medical 
Handbook is held to be valid because regulations embracing the 
same policy could have been. made under section 181. However 
the power to make regulations under section 181 is conferred on 
the Governor-General in Council not on the Commission itself. 
To take the above argument would be to say that in effect the 
Commission has exercised the regulation-making power in section 
181 - a power which it clearly does not have. 
The preferred interpretation of the learned Judge's reasoning is 
that, in looking at section 111 in terms of the policy of the 
Act, Blair J. considers that the legislature obviously intended 
(41) G. W. Palmer, "Accident Compensation and Private Hospitals" 
(1977) N.Z.L.J. 50, 52. 
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that the Commission should formulate a policy along the lines 
of that in the Medical Handbook, and that this conclusion. is 
supported by the regulation-making power in section 181. From 
this point of view, Blair J. is not saying that the Commission 1 s 
policy is valid because the same policy could have been 
implemented by the promulgation of regulations, but rather that 
section 111 read in the context of the Act as a whole envisages 
that the Commission would lay down such a policy , and para. (1) 
of section 181 supports the conclusion that the policy set out 
in the Medical Handbook is not ultra vires the Act . 
This interpretation is supported by the reasoning of Blair J. in 
the earlier Appeal Authority decision of Re Turner . (42 ) There 
the learned Judge said: (43) 
I turn now to s. 111 which must of course be construed 
in its context as part of the Act. The general purpose 
of this section is to impose liability on the Commission 
for the costs of medical hospital and related services 
payable as a result of expenses covered by the 
legislation ... There are a number of references to the 
Social Security Act in the Accident Compensation Act and 
it is obvious enough that in. en.acting the 18.tter Act 
Parliament would dos~ with full knowledge of the rights 
an.a privileges available to New lealanders under the 
Social Security Act. Paragraph (b) u.ses the words 11 the 
amoun.t to be paid is reasonable by Nerv Zealand standards 11 • 
In my opinion the Commission in applying these words is 
perfectly entitled to look at the general structu.re of 
medical services in this country and ask itself in each 
particular case whether it is reasonable by New Zealand 
standards that it should pay private hospital charges 
with their associated specialist fees taking into account 
(42 ) (197 6 ) 1 N.Z.A.R. 7 . 
(4J) ibid 9 . 
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that a "free" hosp.i tal and medical service is available 
under the Social Security Act. 
After considering the policy guidelines in the Medical Handbook , 
Blair J. went on to say: (44 ) 
The above policy statements are not of course part of the 
Act and are not necessarily binding on the Commission or 
anyone else. The booklet as a whole is designed to provide 
a helpful accessory to the Act and I accept it as such. 
The policy statements are really an alternative to 
regulations which could have been made pursuant to 
para.(1) of s. 181 ... It is apparent that s. 181 
contemplates that some flesh should be put on the bare 
bones of s . 111. I think it is c l ear that there is a 
measure of discretion vested in the Commission ins. 111 
as to the payment of medical costs and the Commission 1 s 
decision to produce a policy statement on its proposed 
application of the section is desirable. 
The import of this j udgment is that Blair J. considers that it 
was the intention of the legislature that the Commission should 
follow some form of policy guideline in the application of 
section 111 which complimented its context as part of the Act 
as a whole. The learned Judge considers that the provisions of 
section 181 support this argument - that is, since the 
legislature provided in that section for regulations to be 
made which would have the same ultimate effect as the policy in 
the Medical Handbook had, it indicates that the l egislature 
intended that such considerations would be relevant in the 
application of section 111. 
(4LH ibid 10. 
VUW Law Research Papers: 
There is no 
PAGE 28 or 29 
in this document 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
IIB B&ft" 
JO. 
It is suggested however that much of the argument concerning 
the Commission ' s ability to take into account the factors set 
out in the Medical Hand bool{ has centred arourid a misconstruction 
of para. (b ) . It will be recalled that in ne Ma nthel( 45) 
Blair J . said that "if this section is read literally and in 
isolation", then he thought that counsel's submission , to the 
effect that the Commission's discretion relates to and is 
restricted to quantum only, was correct . This conclusion 
however is based on the ground that, "read literally and in. 
isolation" , section 111 (1) (b) confers an obligation on the 
Commission to pay private hospital and related charges so long 
as such charges are fair and reasonable and the type and extent 
of treatment is normal by New Zealand standards. With respect, 
it is submitted that the Commission's discretion under section 
111 (l ) (b) relates to whether "the amount to be paid by it [the 
Commission.]" is reasonable by New Zealand sta ndards not, as the 
above argument suggests, to whether the hospital charges 
themselves are reasonable by New Zealand standards . This is a 
fine distinction but it is crucial in determining the validity 
of the policy guidelines used by the Commission . 
If the "reasonableness" question. refers to hospital charges 
themse l ves , it would be difficult for the Commission to deny 
liabi li ty for the costs under section 111 . The Woodhouse Report 
in 1 967 said : (46 ) 
We are informed by the Health Department that , with 
increasing ann.ual costs of public hospitals, there may 
(45 ) {1.976 ) 1 N. Z . A. R. 69, 71; Ante p.1..3. 
(46) Supra n . 4 p . 159 . 
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be little difference between the cost of public and 
private hospitals today . Indeed there is evidence 
which shows that in some respects the public hospital 
bed can be more expensive . 
This is supported by a study carried out in 1974 which shows 
that if anything the cost per patient day in. a private hospital 
is actually less than the corresponding cost in the public 
hospital . (47 ) 
If however the emphasis of the provision is not on the actual 
hospital bill itself but on the charge to the Commission, then 
the question whether or not the amount is reasonable by Nev11 
Zealand standards has to be determined in. relation to other 
charges placed on the Commission . If this is the case, then 
it appears that the Commission is justified in only paying for 
the costs of private hospital treatment in appropriate cases. 
As already indicated , if the patient is treated in a public 
hospital then n.o amount is payable by the Commission and 
the ref ore it could hardly be nreasonablen by New Zealand 
standards for the Commission to meet the costs of private 
hospital treatment unless there were exceptional circumstances. 
Certainly this interpretation of section 111 (l)(b) would give 
a more reasonable and practicable result than that argued by 
counsel in Re Manthel . Blair J., in. that case, recognised the 
difficult i es which might occur if the latter interpretation 
was accepted . He pointed out that if, in a particul ar weekend , 
all the Wel lington accident victims elected private hospital 
(47) J. T. Ward , "Towards a Policy for Private Hospitals" 
New Zealand Journal of Public Administration (1975) 
vol. J7 p . J4 . 
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treatment chaos would occur, and he stressed the need to 
regulate the hospital treatment of accident patients according 
to the abilities of the public and private systems to accomodate 
such patients. 
It is submitted that such considerations are relevant in 
determining how section 111 (l)(b) should be interpreted. As 
Maxwell on the Interpretation. of Statutes points out, if the 
language is capable of more than one interpretation the more 
n.atural meaning should be discarded if it leads to an uri.reasonable 
result, and the interpretation which leads to a reasonable and 
practicable result should be adopted. (45 ) In S hannon Realities 
Ltd. v Ville de Michel( 49 ) Lord Shaw said: (50) 
Where alternative constructions are equa lly open that 
alternative is to be chosen which will be co nsistent 
with the smooth working of the system which the Statute 
purports to be regulating; an.d that alternative is to 
be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction 
or confusion into the working of the system. 
Policy Asp~ts of the Arguments 
The effect of the argument put forward by counsel in Re Manthel 
would be to operi private hospital treatment to every accident 
victim in. New Zealand at the public expense. This cannot have 
been the intention of the legislature. 
(48) Maxwell on the Inte_IPretation of Statutes (12th ed. 1969) 
45, 20J-5 see e.g. Gill v Donald Humbershaw & Co Ltd [196JJ 
J All E.R. 180 at 18J per Lord Reid. 
(49) [1924] A.C. 185. 
(50) ibid 192-9J, 
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Because contributions to the various funds under the Act were 
calculated on the basis that the public hospital would be the point 
of first referral for persons injured by accide0t, it is 
suggested that the Commissio n would not be ~ti~g responsibly if 
it agreed to pay private hospital expenses in every case where 
the injured person or his doctor elected that treatment be 
carried out in a private hospital. As Blair J. said in 
Re Turner: (5l) 
... the legislation_ imposes a duty on the Commission to 
have regard to the cost factor and this involves the 
Commission in considering in each case whether the 
public or private hospital system should be used . 
The Commission has a dual responsibility. On the one 
hand it is the guardian of the patients• ~elfare as 
regards_ costs of medical and hospital trea tt!le nt, while 
on the other hand it is the administrator of the 
taxpayers I contributions to its funds an_d m~st ensure 
that these funds are prudently expanded. 
There is support for this in Roberts v Hopwood (52 ) where the 
House of Lords was concerned with the question of a local 
authority 's obligation to pay its employees 11 such wages as it 
may think fi t 11 • Lord Atkin.son said: (53) 
A body charged with the administration for definite 
purposes of funds contributed in whole or in part by 
persons other than members of that body, o\·Jes, in my 
view, a duty to those latter persons to conduct that 
administration in a fairly businesslike manner with 
reasonable care, skill and caution, and with a due 
and alert regard to the interest of those contributors 
(51) (1976) 1 N.Z.A.R. 7, 9. 
(52) [1925] A.C. 578. 
(53) ibid 595-96. 
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who are not me mbers of that body This duty is, 
I think, a legal duty as well as a moral one. 
Accordingly, it was held in that case that the discretion 
conferred upon the Council by the Statute must be exercised 
reasonably, and that the fixing by the Council of an arbitrary 
sum for wages without regard to existing labour conditions was 
not an exercise of that discretion. 
The Accident Compensation Act is an original piece of legislation 
which breaks new ground in providing compensation for victims 
of accidents. It constitutes a code of its 0 1v n and, as regards 
the compensation provisions, the broad scheme is to cushion the 
financial losses 11 hich accrue to victims of accidents but it 
does not purport to give full recompense to those who have 
suffered accidents. The Act creates a code between the State 
and the subjects of the State and the Com.mission is charged with 
the administration of the various funds entrusted by the Act 
to its care. 
In Re Ngarnotu (54 ) Blair J., in dealing with a claim for funeral 
expenses under section 122, had cause to consider what were the 
legi tirnate uses of the Commission. ' s funds. In that case the 
claim for the funeral expenses of a young Maori girl included 
not only the burial expenses but also the other expen.ses arising 
from. the traditional tangihanga preceeding the burial. Section 
122 provides that the Com.mission shall pay the funeral expenses 
11 to the extent that it considers the amount thereof is 
reasonable by New Zealand standards 11 • Blair J. in determining 
the question of vJhat was '1reasonable by Ne1'l Zealand standards 11 , 
(54) Re Ngamotu (1976) 1 N.Z.A.R. 89; Accident Compensation 
Appeal Authority Decision No 1. 
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looked at the scheme of the Act as a whole , and concluded: (55) 
The broad purpose of the Accident Compensation Act would 
not seem to be consistent with the idea that indirect 
expenses or expenses that are above average should be a 
charge on the common fund . Though the Act is a remedial 
and liberal one it does not purport to be fully 
compensatory. Its scheme is rather to be comprehensive 
in its cover and practical in its application . 
Of course , if the only purpose of the Commission
1 s policy as 
regards admissions to private hospitals was to preserve its 
own funds then this , by itself , would not be a proper consider-
ation but clearly this is not the case . As Blair J . said in 
Re Graham: ( 56 ) 
These policy guidelines are what one would expect from a 
statutory body which is charged with the responsibility 
not only to accident victims but also to see that the 
common fund that is administered by the Commission is 
expended prudently and in accordance with the statute . 
There must also be serious implications for the health system 
as a whole if the Commission was liable to meet the costs of 
private hospital charges provided only that such charges were 
"reasonable 11 by New Zealand standards . Governments in New 
Zealand have continually featured in their health policies the 
right of the i ndividual to the freedom of choice between the 
public an.d pr i vate health systems , but in 1972 the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into Social Security issued this ominous 
warning: ( 57 ) 
(55) ibid 95 . 
(56) Re Graham (1976 ) 1 N. Z . A. R . 102 , lOJ ; Accident Compensati o n 
Appeal Authority Decision No 5 . 
(5?) Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security in New 
Zealand . Report Govt . Printer , Wellington 1972 p . 395 . 
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... the pragmatic approach which New Zealand has followed 
~n the health fielaj ... has allowed a dual system to 
develop - State and private side by side. Given limited 
community resources, there is an inherent danger that 
enhancement of the private sector may enable it to claim 
too great a share of these resources and so weaken the 
State sector that it cannot operate as it was intended 
to. The result could well be that an adequate health 
service would not be available to all who need it, but 
only to those who could afI'ord it. 
The effect of imposing the above liability on the Commission 
would be to fully support the private hospital services from 
quasi-public funds in all cases of personal injury by accident. 
This could, in the course~ time, make private hospitals much 
more sought after places of treatment for accident victims. 
This would inevitably lead to a deterioration in the public 
health services and accentuate the very real problems whi ch 
already exist there unless Government vms prepared to take 
steps to remedy the situation. 
It might also be asked whether a person suffering an injury by 
accident and having cover under the Act should have better 
'5,v - f'\~c.. ,~ 
access to the nation's health facilities than/who is not so 
covered. For example, should a person 1vho suffers a hernia as a 
result of a personal injury by accident(SB) be able to avoid the 
waiting lists for public hospital treatment, while another person. 
who also suffers a hernia but who does not have cover under the 
Act has no choice but to take his place in the queue. On 
humanitarian an.a welfare grounds such discrimin.ation. should not 
occur although it can be argued, that in so far as the scheme of 
the Act itself distinguishes between accident victims and sickness 
(58 ) See section 66 of the Act for the circumstances in which a 
person suffering a heroia will be entitled to compensation 
un.der the Act. 
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victims, there would be no anomaly if perso'.1.s who have cover 
unde r the Act were given freeprivate hospital treatment. 
VICmRlA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
IIDDADV 
JS . 
V . 'I'HE AP.l?LlCA'J'ION O •' THE POLICY 
This sectlon of the paper is concerned wlth the way ln whlch the 
Commlssion ' s pollcy guidelines lald down in the Medical Handbook 
have been applied at the nevievJ Hearings and ori appeal to the 
Appeal Authority . This has involved a review of the available 
decisions and the primary aim of the exercise has been to 
observe the trends which have emerged concerning the application 
of the Commission ' s policy . lt will be both necessary and 
desirable to consider briefly the differing functions and powers 
of the two levels of hearing during the course of the discussion . 
~ications for Reviev-1 
The relevant section in the Act covering the hearing of 
applications for review is section 154 . The nature of the Review 
Hearing was examined by the Appeal Authority in Re Harvey . (5 9 ) 
I3 la l r J . said : ( 6 O ) 
This is not a judicial enquiry in the strict sense . Its 
p urpose , as its name suggests , is to have afresh look at 
the administrative deicision made by the Commission while 
giving the appellant the opportunity to dispute the 
d ecision and introduce any new eviden.ce or information 
r1hich m0y be relevant . Evidence can be received whether 
or not it ls admissible in a Court of Law . The only 
l imi tatlon on eviden.ce is that it should be relevant and 
that it should be available to the claimarit . Proceed i ngs 
are conducted more or less informall y . The Hearing 
Officer attempts both to gi ve information to the claimant 
and to obtain information from him which will throw light 
on his case . 
In several of the Review Hearings (6l ) where t~e Commission ' s 
orie;inal d ecision has been reversecl it has been pointed out by 
(59 ) Re Harvey (1977 ) 1 N. Z . A . R . 166 . Accide0t Compensation 
Appeal Authority Decision No 16 . 
( 60 ) ibid 171 . 
(61 ) see e . g . Review Hearing· - No 74/ ROOJ21 ; No 75/ TIOJ92 
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the Hearing Officer concerned that the evidence presented at 
the Hearing has been different in some way from that on which 
the original decision was based. 
A survey of all Review Hearing decisions up until July 1976 
revealed that applications for review concerning private hospital 
expenses under section 111 constituted about 1J% of total RevieY'J 
Hearings, second only to those concerned with the question of 
personal injury by accident under section 2 which made up about 
25% of total Review Hearings. Of the 46 Review Hearings 
~ oncerning the payment of private hospital costs which had been 
decided at that date, 72% of the applications had been. allowed 
in whole or in part and only 28% had been declined. 
It is only those cases where prior approval to the admission to 
private hospital has not been obtained from the Commission which 
give rise to problems in this area (including the odd case where 
approval has been sought an.d refused and the applicant has 
nevertheless entered a private hospital and still claimed the 
costs incurred from the Commission( 62 )). The fact that the 
Commission 1 s approval has not been sought prior to the 
operation has no bearing on the decision reached. It has been 
recognised that in many cases where, for example, there are 
circumstances existing which make it essential that the operation 
be performed immediately (though the urgency is not such to 
warrant immediate admission to a public hospital), the time factor 
would probably have dictated the carrying out of the operation 
before an answer could be given by the Commission even if approval 
had been sought. ( 6 3} 
(62) See e.g. Review Hearing No 75/RO?ll. 
(6 3 ) See e.g. Review Hearings: No 74/R00298; No 75/R0768. 
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In practice the broad policy which has developed is that the 
Commission will not usually pay private hospital costs if the 
patient could have obtained equally satisfactory treatment in 
the public hospital or within a reason.able time . However this 
is by no means strictly applied and the Commission. has been 
involved in the delicate exercising of balancing the various 
factors , one against the other , using the policy considerations 
set out in the Medical Handbook as a guide . 
The waiting time involved in obtaining t reatment at the public 
h . t 1 . . . d t . ( 64 ) Th . 1 · ttl ospi a is a primary consi era ion . ere is i e 
cr i ticism of the record of public hospitals in dealing with 
emergency cases for patients whose need is considered as urgent , 
but for other cases the extensive waiting lists and the fact 
that public hospital trea tmen.t is not un.i versally available 
within a reasonable period is forcing more and more people to 
accept private speciali st and hospital care . The Commis s ion has 
set this factor off against others which might materially 
affe c t t he welfare of the pat i ent . Where the patient would have 
suffered undue pain and discomfort , albeit not sufficient to 
warrant immediate admission to a public hospital, the Commission 
has been reluctant to decline liabi l ity for the costs of private 
hospital treatment . (651 The convenience of the patient alone 
woul d probably not be sufficient to warrant the Commissi o n 
accepting the liability for private hospital charges but where 
there are other considerations as well it is a relevant factor . ( 66 ) 
( 64 ) At the Census of Hospitals o n 2Jrd March 1971 , there were 
J6 , 00J names on waiting lists for admission to publ ic 
hospitals , a rate of 12 . 6 persons per 1, OOO residents : ~, .. qir<1 i\ 6 
Govt . Printer , ~ellington 1976 p . 146 . 
( 65 ) See e . g . Review Hearings : No 75/ Ro968; No 75/ROOJ l; 
No 76/Rl665 . 
( 66) See e . g . Review Hearings : No 75/ROOJl; No 74/R00178 . 
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Section 4 outlines the purposes and scope of the Act and para. 
(b) of that section provides for "the rehabilitat ion of persons 
who suffer personal injury by accident ... so as to seek to 
Estore all such persons to the fullest physical , mental, social, 
vocational , and economic usefulness of which they are capable ". 
The Commission has therefore been very conscious of the 
" rehabilitat i on" factor and in. many instances the costs of 
private hospital treatment has been met because such treatment 
has materially aided the "rehabilitation." of the patieri.t . (67) 
Two Review Hearing decisions have helped i~ the interpretation of 
what is meari.t by "rehabilitation" . The first case( 6S) concerned 
a university student who had transferred himself from a public 
to a pr i vate hospital because he considered that his chances 
of passing his final two subjects would have disappeared if he 
had remained in the public hospital . He argued that the 
Commission should pay the costs of the private hospital treatment 
on the grounds that it had materially and substantially 
advanced his rehabilitation . The Hearing Officer did not agree 
ari.d said : 
Rehabilitation i n this sense means restoration t o the 
patient ' s pre - accident physical and economic position . 
The fact that any person happens, at the time of the 
accident , t o be engaged in any particular course of study 
which may in the future improve their economic posit i on 
is riot in itself sufficient to j ustify that person ' s 
removal from a public to a private hospital at the 
expense of the Accident Compensation Commission . 
( 67 ) See e . g . Review Hearings : No . 74/R00289 ; No 74/R0178; 
No 75/R0062 ; No 75/ROJOS . 
( 68 ) Review Hearing No 74/R00181 . 
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In the second case( 69 ) the Hearing Officer considered that the 
Commission had been too restrictive in denying the claim on 
the grounds that the case would not fall into the urgent 
category , and that the patient ' s employment had not been 
hampered by the injury . He said : 
I do not t hink these grounds are sufficient to decline the 
c l a i m. It i s , certainly , important to con.sider 
rehabilitation for employment purposes , but the concept 
of rehabilitation goes much wider than this . Rehabil i tatiot1 
extends to the restoration , as speedily as possible , to 
the fullest physical , mental and social fitness of which 
that person is capable 
The appl icant was , due to injury , precluded from fol l owing 
pursuits which formed a large and important part of his 
life and , due to inability to receive public hospital 
treatment , he would have been precluded from pursuing his 
l eisure activities for some considerable time in the future . 
The mere fact alone that the applicant could continue to 
work is not sufficient reason for denying him surgical 
treatment for at least a year with resultant inabi li ty to 
do things in life which give him great pleasure . 
The Commission has also been concerned that the person requiring 
treatment should not suffer financially . Two separate types of 
case are i n i ssue here . First , the Commi ssion has been prepared 
to meet the costs of pr i vate hosp i tal t reatment where the 
}:lltien.t has not been advised of the fin.ancial implications of 
entering a private hospital and t he Commission considers that 
it would be unjust , or that financial hardship would result , if 
the patient or his relatives had t o meet the costs themse l ves . ( ?O ) 
( 69 ) Review Hearing No 75/ROJ92 . 
( ?O ) See e . g . Review Hearings : No 75/R0065; No 74/ROOJl? . 
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Secondly, the Commission has been prepared to meet such costs 
to alleviate the economic hardship on the patient which has 
resulted from his diminished earning capacity. ( 7l) The other 
aspect to this category of case of course, is that the Commissio~ 
is very aware of the fact that if the waiting time involved for 
public hospital treatment is too extended there is the possibility 
that the earnings related compensation which would have to be 
paid in some cases would far outstrip the costs of the private 
hospital treatment. In these cases it is obviously to the 
~vantage of both the Commission and the patient that the 
patient receive treatment in a private hospital, at the 
Commission 1 s expense, so that the patient can be restored to full 
earning capacity . (7 2 ) 
The weight given to any of these factors often depends on the 
status of the applicant himself . For example, whether he is an 
earner or a non-earner: ( 7J) 
In hernia strains suffered by earners, particularly those 
engaged in manual work, where the hernia is not 
immediately serious, the case for accepting responsibility 
for meet ing private hospital costs, while public hospital 
services are unable to cope, is not in question. With 
non-earners, however, a reasonable period of waiting for 
a vacant bed is not so vital, if repair of hernia is not 
a matter of urgency. 
The age of the applicant also appears to be a relevant factor. 
In several Review decisions(?4 ) involving geriatric claims the 
(?l) 
(72 ) 
(7J) 
( 74) 
See e.g. Review Hearings: No 75/Ro768; No ?4/ROOJ21; 
No 75/R08Jl. 
see e.g. Review Hearing No 75/R0462. 
Review Hearing No 75/R0165. 
see e.g. Review Hearings: No ?4/ROJ68; No 75/R0180; 
No 7 5/R0256. 
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Commission has accepted liability for the costs of private 
hospital treatment on the circumstances of the particular case 
and has expressly stated that no precedent should be taken from 
the decision. A large proportion of these cases relate to the 
Auckland Hospital Board 1 s practice of transferring geriatric 
cases from the public to private hospitals, a problem which 
will be discussed l ater in the paper. ( 75 ) However, obiter by 
Blair J. in an early Appeal Authority decision( 76} supports the 
vie\-v that the age of the applicant is a relevan.t consideration. 
In that case, the applicant, aged 77, had suffered a hernia and 
entered private hospital for his operation. There were two 
questibns for consideration: First, was the incapacity brought 
about by the hernia "personal in.jury by accident" within the 
terms of the Act; secondly, if so, in the particular circumstan c es 
of the case, were the private hospital and surgical expenses 
compensatable by the Commission. The conclusion., both at the 
Review Hearing and on appeal, was that the evidence did not 
support the contention that the incapacity resulting from the 
hernia occurred as a result of an accident. Therefore, the 
question of whether the Commission would meet the costs of 
the private hospital treatment did not have to be answered. 
However, in the early stages of the dispute liability was 
declined, not on the grounds that in the particular circumsta nces 
there was no "accident 11 , but on. the grounds that the appellant 
should have waited for his operation until the public hospital 
. 
could take him since there was no urgency for the operation. 
Blair J. disagreed with this and felt moved to comment: ( 77 ) ____ ___. __ _ 
(75) Post. Y· E:, 
(7 6 ) (197 6 ) 1 N.Z.A.R. 45; Accident Compensation Appeal Authority 
Decision No J. 
(77) ibid 47-48. 
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Had this case been fou ght solely on the initial ruling 
the appellant might well have succeeded. Anything I say 
on this point is of course obiter. My own impression ... 
is that if it was a fact that the appellant would have 
been required to wait for a long time for his operation 
in the public hospital (and there is quite strong evidence 
as to this), then because of his age it might have been 
reasonable to make arrangements for an early operation. 
A man of 77 years has a limited expectation of life and 
unlike a younger person cannot afford to wait a lengthy 
period for surgical treatment. 
The Commission will also take into account any special 
characteristic of the particular applicant's case which may have 
a bearing on the question of whether it will accept the liability 
for private hospital treatment. For example, the Commission has 
been prepared to meet these costs in a situation where it was 
felt that public hospital treatment would not be conducive to 
the welfare of the patient because she had undergone a traumatic 
experience on. a previous occasion when. she had attended the same 
public hospital.(?B) Similarly, the Commission has been prepared 
to meet these costs in a case where an elderly patient had 
transferred herself from the public to a private hospital because 
"she believed she was going to be don.e away with".(? 9 ) The 
Commission considered that this genuine fear of euthanasia 
warranted special consideration. 
A recent Review Hearing(BO) considered the question of the 
Commission. 's liability for the costs of medical treatment outside 
New Zealand. That case concerned a patient who was totally 
paralysed in an acciden.t, losing the use of all his faculties. 
(?8) Review Hearing No 74/R00242. 
(79) Review Hearin g No 74/Roo19B. 
( 8 O) Revie1v Hearing No 76/R0786. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
LIRDADV 
46 . 
He was discharged from the public hospital into his wife ' s care. 
Over a year later the wife took the husband to Australia for 
a visit but as a result of travelling and airport delays the 
husband contracted pneumonia and had to spen.d 11 days in. 
hospital in Australia . The Commission's liability for such 
treatment is governed by section 111 ( 8) and ( 9) . 
( 81) Under 
subsection (8) · the prior approval of the Commission is a 
prerequisite unless there are special circumstances that, in the 
opin.ion of the Commission, justify payment being made. The 
Commission has an unfettered discretion as to whether it will 
meet the costs or not . The Hearing Officer thought there were 
strong grounds for saying that the Commission's financial outlay 
on hospital treatment should n.ot be increased beyond what it 
would have been in New Zealand because of the voluntary 
withdrawal of the claimant from the benefits of the New Zeal and 
hospital system. However, mindfu l of the fact that there was 
no cost-free hospital treatment available to the patient in 
Australia, the Hearing Officer allowed the claim for two reasons; 
first, the wife's personal sacrifices in the interests of her 
husband had lessened the Commission ' s financial obligations; 
secondly, it was considered that the tragic circumstances of 
the case justified a measure of liberality . 
Two final points are worthy of mention here . First , it appears 
that where the Commission has already paid part of the c osts of 
the private hospital treatment (for example , where the bill for 
the specialist's services has tended s eparately, apart from the 
(81) As enacted by the Accident Compensation Amendment Act 1975 
section 16. 
VIC O IA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
LIRD A DV 
47. 
hospital bill itself, and pa id), it has considered this to be a 
fa ctor in support of payment of the rest of the bill. (52 ) 
Secondly, in only one of the Review He a ring decisions surveyed 
did the Commission express doubts as to the reasonableness of 
t he actual monetary amount charged on the bill for the private 
hospital treatment aria on that occasion the fees were paid 
a nyway "in the special circumstances of the case". (SJ) These 
are significant observations because they support the general 
conclusio~ reached later in the paper that the Commission 
follows a policy of either accepting the costs of private 
hospital and associated specialists fees in full or not at all.( a 4 ) 
It does appear therefore that in practice the Commission 1 s polic y 
has been applied as it was intended to be applied - namely, in a 
"flexible and co-operative 11 way, with "the welfare of the patient 
being regarded as paramount". In reaching its decision, the 
Commission has been prepared to approach the question of its 
liability for private hospital treatment on three interacting 
levels: first, the policy guidelines themselves as set out in 
the Medical Handbook; second, the general status of the applicant; 
third, any special characteristic of the particular applicant 1 s 
case. Ho ~vever the Commission has been a1vare of its nresponsibility 
for the proper disbursement of funds compulsorily contributed 
by the public 11 , and has properly balanced the above considerations 
against the general proposition that the public hospital system 
was intended to be the point of first referral under the Act. 
(82) See e.g. Review Hearings: No 74/R001?8; No 75/ROJ08. 
(8J) Review Hearing No 74/ROOJl?. 
( 84) Post. t- ::; 6 . 
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The Appeal Authority 
Under section 162 (a) of the Act there is a general right to 
appeal against a decision given on the hearing of an application 
for revier,,,1. The appeal is made to the Appeal Authority which 
is a judicial body exercising a judicial function . Section 
164 (1) provides that every appeal shall be by way of rehearing 
and the Authority has the right to rehear any or all of the 
s • .i) -
evidence under / section (2) and (J). 
In Re Harvey( 85 ) Blair J . looked generally at the role of the 
Appeal Authority. He said : (86 ) 
... when. an appeal comes to the Appeal Authority by way 
of rehearing, the Authority must judge the appeal not 
as an appeal coming from a Court of Law but as one 
evolving from a review of an administrative decision . 
The power con.ferred on the Appeal Authority under section 164 
raises the interesting but difficult question of the Authority's 
power to exercise the discretion conferred on the Commission 
un.der section 111 (l)(b). It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to examine in depth the state of the law on the general question 
of appeals from the exercise of a discretion. Suffice to say 
at this point that the various authorities indicate that 11 there 
is no sin.gle precise answer as to the extent of appellate review 
of the exercise of a discretion.". (87 ) The paper will however 
examine the more specific question of how the Appeal Authority 
has viewed its role as the appellate body from the Commission's 
(85 ) (197 6 ) 1 N, Z . A.R . 166. 
(86 ) ibid 171. 
(87 ) K. J. Keith , 11 Appeals from Administrative Tribunals: The Existing Judicial Experience" , (1 969 ) 5 V. U. W.L. R . 123, 151 and see generally pp . 1J4 et seq . 
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exercise of the discretion conferred on it under section 
111 (l)(b). 
In Re Manthel Blair J . referred to two cases dealing with the 
attitude of the respective appellate bodies to the decisions 
of specialist tribunals . In R v National Insurance Commissioner, 
Ex parte Michae1 (88 ) there was an application to quash a decision 
of a Commissioner appointed by Statute to deal with internal 
disputes . The main issue before the Commissioner was one of 
fact which he had decided against the appellant . May J. who 
delivered the judgment of the Court commented that he might 
have reached a differe n t conclusion. Ho wever the Court refused 
to interfere. It was said : 
Where a real error of l a w is shown then this Court will 
interfere but it would in my opinion be wrong by gradual 
erosion of the basic principle to set up this Court as 
in effect a Court of Appeal on fact from decisions of the 
specialist tribunals . 
Similarly , in the earlier case of R v Industrial Injuries 
Commissioner Lord Denning M. R. expressed the view that it was a 
mistake to interfere too much with the decisions of the 
arbitrators to whom the legislature had entrusted the 
administration of compensation. 
Blair J. distinguished these authorities on the ground that 
they concerned certiorari applications , and turned to the 
decision of the New Zeala nd Court of Appeal in Hammond v Hutt 
Valley Milk Board . ( 9o) In that case it was said that where a 
(88) [1976] 1 All E.R. 566. 
(89) [1966] 1 All E .R. 97 , 101 . 
(90) [1958] N. Z .L. R . 720. 
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statute has conferred a ri ght of appeal with expressed powers to 
reverse, vary etc. the decision appealed against, ( 9l) "the 
appellant tribunal is bound to form an opinion of its own as 
to the merits of the matter and is entitled to substitute its 
opinion for that of the administrative body 11 .( 92 ) Blair J. 
considered that this decision covered the situation which arose 
un.der the Accident Compensation Act concerning appeals from the 
Review Hearing decision to the Appeal Authority. 
However , in the Ham~2nd case the Court of Appeal considered that 
the appeal provision under consideration, "of necessity calls 
for a hearing afresh for the purpose of determining the merits 
of the matter ... because there has been nothing in the nature 
of a formal hearing by the Board , there are o.o l 1 3c.l. :J,::., ·1:.:; for its 
decision and there is no record of the proceedings for 
examination on. appeal" . ( 9J) This is clearly different to the 
situation which exists in the appeal stru8ture under the Accident 
Compensation Act and Blair J's. reliance on the Hammond 
decision in Re Manthel shows some inconsistency with his 
reasoning in a later decision - Re Sharland.( 94 ) 
In Re Sharland counsel for the applicant pointed out that section 
164 provided that appeals should be "by way of rehearing" and 
submitted, with reference to some Town and Country Planning cases, (9 
that the Appeal Authority should in each case carry out an 
investigatio:1 de nova a::id snould make its decision unfettered in 
any way by the earlier decision of the Hearing Officer . 
( 91) 
( 92) 
(9J) 
(94) 
( 95) 
------------- ----
c.f. s ect ion. 164(7) Acciden.t Compen.sation Act. 
[1958] N.Z.L.R. 720, 728. 
idem. 
(1927) Accident Compensation Appeal Authority Decision No 48. (Unreported at the time this paper was written - reference 
No 85/77). 
See e . g . Wellington Club v Wellington Citv [1972] N.Z.L.R. 698 
Ross v Planning Ap12._~al Board [197 J 2 N. 2 .L.R. 206. 
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Blair J. considered that the hearing by the Appeal Board in the 
Town arid Country Planning Act was the exercise o~ an original 
jurisdiction arid not a second step in some form of judicial 
process and that therefore there was really no comparison with 
the appeal situation existing under the Accident Compensation 
Act as between the Review Hearing and the Appeal Authority. Th2; 
learned Judge said: (96) 
I accept, as I have said in an earlier case, that the 
Review Hearing is not a judicial heari~g. It is, as the 
name indicates, a review or a fresh look at an 
administrative decision already made by t1:1.e Commission. 
However, the procedure at a Revlew Hearing is entirely 
different to that operating at local body level in the 
Town and Country Plan.ning legislation. The Review 
Hearing is conducted by a Hearing Officer specially 
appointed by the Chairman. Generally he h"1s legal 
qualifications. In practice the evidence arid sabmissions 
are meticulously recorded. The applicant or his 
representative is entitled to be present an.j all relevant 
evidence that the Hearing Officer has must be disclosed. 
Examination anj cross-examination are carried out though 
the proceedings are deliberately conducted in a fairly 
informal way and are inquisitorial in n9.t: .. i.re to en.able 
an applicant (particularly if not represented by counsel) 
to bring out such evidence as he thinks fit . In due 
course the Hearing Officer gives a written decision with 
reasons and the Commission is bound to give effect to 
the decision It is true •.. that all Hearing Officers 
are officers in the employment of the Commission and that 
on occasions their decisions may be controlled to some 
extent by administrative rulings. However, they are 
senior officers and of course their primary duty when 
appointed under section 154 is to administer the statute. 
Their decisions are subject to scrutiny and appeal up to 
the Court of Appeal level and accordingly there is little 
chance of bureaucratic administration ... 
-----------
(96) Re Sharland (1 977 ) Accident Compensatio'.1 Appeal Authority Decision-ro 48 (Unreported). 
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Blair J . then went on to say: 
Because of the terms of that Act and th9 operation of 
procedures carried out at Review Hearings, I do not think 
that the Appeal Authority is required to hear appeals 
de nova ... the Appeal Authority can in an appropriate 
case come to its own opinion on the merits as well as 
the law but this i s something which should be done 
wi th some circumspection . 
The fact that in the Hammond decision it was held that the ----
magistrate ' s po~er on appeal from a decision of a milk board 
allo0ating milk rounds obliged him to determine the matter de nova 
on the merits ~9Z~ereas i t has clearly been established that under 
the Accident Compensation Act the Appeal Authority is not 
required to hear appeals de nova, s~ggests that perhaps Blair J . 
was mistaken to rely on Hammond 1 s case in Re Manthel . - - ---
In spite of this apparent conflict however , the learned Judge has 
taken a consistent view of what he considers is the correct 
approach of the Appeal Authority . The same conclusion Bl air J . 
reaches i n. Re Sharland (above) is also expressly set out after 
his consideration. of Hamm.ond 1 s case in B:e Man.thel :( 9S ) 
(a ) The Appeal Authority s hould interfere if of opinio n 
that an error of law has been made or the decision 
reached by the application. of wrong principles . 
( b) It may interfere where the decision relates to t he 
exercise of discretion or to a f i nding of fact 
provided that the Appeal Authority has reheard t he 
evidence or permitted the introduction of f r esh 
evidence which has thrown fresh l ight on. the matter 
i n issue s o that the Appeal Authority is in as 
( 97 ) See K. J . Keith , supra n . 87 pp . 14J- 45 . 
( 98 ) ( 197 6 ) 1 N. Z . A . R . 6 9 , 7 J . 
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good a position as the Hearing Officer to form 
a fresh opinion. 
(c) Subject to the above the Appeal Authority should 
be circumspect in overruling a decision based on 
the original eviden.ce ari.d vvhich amounts to the 
exercise of a discretion. 
There have been eight appeals before the Appeal Authority vvh3re 
the question of the Commission 1 s liability to meet the costs of 
private hospital treatment has been in issue. These represented 
about 16.5% of all appeals decided by the Appeal Authority up 
until the end of July 1977. Six of these appeals were dismissed 
with the Appeal Authority supporting the decision made at the 
Review Hearing and in one case the question. did not have to be 
answered because a preliminary question was decided against 
the applicant. (99) 
It is useful to consider the Appeal Authority's approach in the 
other case. In Re Turner(lOO) the patient had been involved in 
a ski-ing accident. An orthopaedic surgeon who vms contacted 
by telephone considered early surgery desirable and advised 
that a private hospital wciuld be preferable to a public one. 
The Hearing Officer declined liability for the payment of the 
private hospital costs on the ground that the Commission's 
policy was well known to those persons who would be moat affected 
by the decision made by the Commission an.d there was no evidence 
to suggest that the care anj treatment in the public hospital 
would have been inadequate in any way. 
( 99) Ante p. :.,1r 
(100) (197 6 ) 1 N.Z.A.R. 7; For the Review Hearing decision in 
this case see Review Hearing No 74/R00157, 
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On appeal to the Appeal Authority , Blair J . examined his 
function and said : (l Ol) 
My task as the Appeal Authority is to decide whether in. the 
c i rcumstances of this case the Commission should have 
declined to pay the private hospital expenses and surgical 
fees . I am conscious that the decision of the Commission 
t hrough the Hearing Officer was to a considerable extent 
an exercise of a discretion and an appellate tribunal will 
not lightly interfere in such circumstances. However , 
under s.164 it is provided that the appeal shall be by way 
of rehearing . In. effect the Appeal Authority hears a new 
case with a right to hear additional evidence , Under these 
circumstances I do not think I can shrink from expressing 
my opinion on the facts and submissions which I heard which 
may well have differences from those presented to the 
Hearing Officer . My duty , I think , is to look at the 
whole case do nova and give my opinion as I see it . 
In the light of after ascertained facts, the learned Judge found 
that t he patient could have received proper treatment in. the 
public hospital , but felt nevertheless that: (l02 ) 
... in the circumstances it would be proper for the 
Commission to agree to make a compromise paymen.t which 
on the one hand recognises that in the light of present 
knowledge a claim for private hospital treatment coul d 
not be sustained , but on the other hand accepts that the 
decision to send a pa tien.t to a private hospital was an 
u nderstandable error for which there was a degree o f 
j ustificat i on . 
The matter was accordingly referred back to the Commission for i t 
to fix the amount as the Appeal Authority was empowered to do 
under section 164 (8 ).( lOJ ) 
( 101 ) 
( 102 ) 
( 1 OJ ) 
ibid 11 . 
ibid 12 . 
For the Commission 1 s fin.al decision. on this matter see 
i'ost. p, 5'.:, 
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On the particular facts of this case therefore the Appeal 
Authority did feel competent, after hearing ne1,1 evidence, to 
disagree with the decision of the Hearing OfficeL Because of 
the presence of the new evidence it is submitted that this 
decision is not inconsistent with the decision in Re Manthel . 
In fact Re Turner was distinguished in Re Manthel on the grounds 
that it was a case II v,1here the injury vvas more serious an.d where 
the decision to go to the private hospital was influenced by a 
mistaken belief that there would be delay in getting treatment'' .(to4 ) 
( 1 04 ) ( 1 9 7 6 ) 1 N • Z • A • R • 6 9 , 7 J . 
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VI. SPECIAL PROBLEMS 
This section of the paper \·I/ill consider three specific areas which 
have caused the Commission some concern in the application of its 
policy regarding its liability for the costs of private hospital 
treatment. Hopefully this examination will indicate to some 
extent how the Commission has been willing to modify its position 
and adapt its policy in situations ~1/hich require special 
consideration. 
The Amount to be Paid 
The Commission has always had the attitude that under section 
111 (l)(b) it will pay either the full amount claimed for the 
private hospital treatment or nothing at all. It has not, at the 
Review Hearings, entered into a discussion of the merits of the 
particular case in order to determine how much of the bill should 
be paid by the Commission. Rather, its policy has been that if, 
after a consideration of the various factors set out in the 
Medical Handbook (of which , 11 the actual cost of the private 
hospital treatment" is one), it considers that in the circumstances 
of the particular case it was reasonable to incur private hospital 
treatment, then the cost of that treatment will be paid in full 
by the Commission. 
In Re Turner(l05) however, Blair J. considered that a different 
approach might be more appropriate. In that case the learned 
Judge found that al though adequate public hospital facilities 
were available at the time, the surgeon was nevertheless justified 
in admitting the patient to a private hospital in view of the 
urgency of the case. This, the learned Judge considered, put the 
(105) (1976) 1 N.Z.A.R. 7. 
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Commission. into something of a dilemma because to decline payment 
on the grounds that, in the light of after-ascertained facts, 
the patient could have received proper treatment in a public 
hospital had he elected to do so, would be a too rigid and 
narrow approach and would disregard "some particular and peculiar 
features of the case". 
After considering the words in section 111, Blair J. concluded: (lOo) 
In applying subs. (1) of the section the Commission 1s 
acting in an administrative way which involves the 
exercise of some discretion and the Commission has itself 
acknowledged that its policy should be flexible. 
Inevitably there will be occasions when the Commission. 
will be confronted with claims for payments under s . 111 
which are neither entirely meritorious nor entirely 
without merit. In such circumstances the duty to pay 
an amount which 11s reason.able by New lealand standards" 
permits in my opinion the Commission to fix an amount 
which is less than the costs actually incurred. It seems 
to me that it would be artificial in such circumstances 
for the Commission to be obliged to pay either the full 
amount claimed or nothing at all. I believe para. (b) 
bestows a measure of discretion which enables the 
Commission to deal realistically with such situations and 
allows it to award an arbitrary amount which it thinks 
is reasonable in the circumstances by New Zealand standards. 
Such an award would recognise that while the claim is not 
wholly meritorious there is an element of merit which 
warrants a partial acceptance of the claim ... 
The general purpose of para. (b) read in its context is 
to en.able the Commission to pay a reasonable amount for 
claims for medical treatment and in my view entitles the 
(106) ibid 12. 
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the Commission to reduce a claim to a figure which is 
commensurate to what it thinks is the justice of the 
case taking into account the circumstances under which 
the medical costs were incurred . 
Blair J . accordingly referred the matter back to the Commission 
for it to fix the amount pursuant to section 164 (8) of the 
Act . However , while in this particular case the Commission 
did make a "compromise" payment, it has not accepted Blair J's. 
recommendation as a gen.eral principle of policy . 
In a Technical Information Circular distributed after the 
Re Turner decision, the Commission made it clear that: (l07) 
Normal Commission policy will continue to be that, after 
consideration of the factors set out in the Medical 
Handbook the cost of private hospital treatment will 
be either accepted in full or not accepted at all. In 
other words the Commission believes that , in almost every 
case, it is impossible to place a percentage on the level 
of merit and accordingly pay that percentage in cash . 
The Circular does not exclude the possibility however that there 
may be occasions when the Commission, either on its own 
initiative or as a result of representatio ns , will be prepared 
to offer a contribution towards the cost of treatment. 
Private Medical Insurance 
A related issue concerns private medical insurance . New Zealand 
does n.ot have any compulsory health insurance per se (although 
the Accident Compensation Act can be seen to have tha t effect 
since part of the levies paid to the Commission are made 
available for hospital anj other health expenses ), but the 
establishment and growth of voluntary medical insurance 
(107) Technical Information Circular No T . 208 . 
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organisations indicates a dissatisfaction with the adequacy of 
the public sector in the provision of health services. For 
example , the largest society in the field today , the Southern 
Cross Medical Care Society , has consistently achieved an 
astonishing 50 to 60 per cent cumulative expansion rate since 
1966 and its membership today is approaching the half million 
mark. 
The approach of all such groups is broadly the same . For a fixed 
premium contributors could normally expect to get a refund of 
up to 80 per cent of their net costs (after Social Security 
deductions ). 
The question arose as to whether the Commission or the Medical 
Insurance Societies had first charge on the private hospital 
fees where the person injured by accident was a member of such 
a Society . This issue has not been of major concern in practice 
because usually in cases where the applicant has been covered by 
medical insurance the first charge has already been made on the 
Society concerned by the time the case comes before the 
Commission. arid tr1e latter h::ts 00.1~, been. faced c\1ith a claim for 
the difference between ~vhat the Society has paid and the net 
cost of the private medical treatment .(l08 ) 
Initially, the view taken by the Commission. wa s that no account 
was to be taken of any medical society insurance which the 
injured person might have . (lo9 ) This was consistent with the 
Commission. 1 s attitude that if it agreed to meet the private 
hospital expenses then it would undertake the payment of the whole 
of those expenses . ----------------------
( 108) See e . g . Re Stevens (1976) Accident Compensation Appeal Authority Decision No 21 . Reported in the Accident Compensation Commission Report , May 1977 p . JJ ; also Review Hearings : No 75/Ro968; No 75/R0496 ; No 76/Rl665 . 
(109) Technical Information Circula r No T.1 88 . 
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However the comments of Blair J. in Re Turner concerning the ability 
of the Commission to lay down a general policy relating to its 
liability to meet the costs of private hospital treatment, 
appears to have changed the Commission 1 s attitude to the question 
of private medical insurance. In a memorandum issued in June 1976 
the Commission 1 s Chief Solicitor expressed the opinion that, in 
the light of comments made in Re Turner, the Commission could and 
should ascertain whether an injured person has a medical society 
insurance If\lhich would meet part of the net costs of private 
hospital treatment. 
This therefore appears to be one area where the Commission may not 
necessarily pay the full cost of the private hospital treatment 
if it accepts liability for that cost. 
The Attitude of the Medical Profession 
The medical profession has always been a powerful lobbying force 
in New Zealand 1 s history. In the 19J0 1 s and early 1940 1 s when 
the first Labour Government was trying to implement its proposal 
to provide a comprehensive State health service available free of 
charge to the citizens of New Zealand , it was forced to concede 
several principles to the medical profession as a result of the 
pressure put on it by the New Zealand Branch of the British 
Medical Association (now the Medical Association of New 
Zealand). (llO) 
(110) see generally, W. B. Sutch, The Responsible Soci~ in Ne~v 
Zealand Christchurch 1972; New Zealand Department of 
Health, A Health Service for New Zealand, Govt. Printer 
Wellington 1974; Medical Association of New Zealand, 
Revie~ of Medical Services: Preliminary Report, Dunedin 
1°9b7; Department of Health, The Medical Services 
Committee Report, Govt. Printer, Wellington. 1948. 
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The area of primary concern to the profession has been its means 
of remuneration. There has been a continuing concern at 
i ncreasirig State involvement in the country I s health services 
and the profession has reacted strongly to any move which has 
suggested that it might become in. essence a salaried servant 
of the State. In 1940 the Social Security legislation provided 
for doctors to be given a salary i t1 country areas and in 
hospitals, and other medical practitioners to be paid an 
annual "capitation" fee on. the basis of fixed lists of patients. 
However, general dissatisfaction on the part of the profession 
led to a series of modifications to the method of remuneration 
until the "schedule" system, which, together with the 11 refund" 
system, operates today, was adopted. 
Over 90% of general practitioners use the "schedule'' system 
under which they charge the patient a fee for service and claim 
the medical benefits directly from the Department of Health. 
The method of remuneration by item of service is traditional 
in private practice and has always had the support of the 
iedical profession itself . (lll) 
In the public hospitals however, (as well as for a small nu.mber 
of general practitioners in the more remote areas of the 
cou.ntry), a salaried system continu.es to operate. Consequently 
doctors and especially surgeons have bu.ilt up private practices 
arid personal income on a fee for service basis by working part-
time in private hospitals while also holding a salaried positio~ 
(111) Under section 111 (l)(b) of the Act the Commission is 
responsible to pay that portion of the doctor's fee not 
covered by the health benefit u.nder Part II of the 
Social Seicurity Act 1964 , so far as the Commission 
co~.siders the amou.nt it pays is "reasonable by New 
Zealand standards". The Commission's policy on this 
question is also set out in the Med ical Hand book at 
pp .17- 22 . 
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on a "sessional" basis at a public hospital. Un.fortunately, 
this is not an entirely satisfactory situatio1. As one 
commentator has pointed out, "so long as consultants are 
employed in public hospitals on a part-time basis they are 
unlikely to pursue policies in their salaried hospital role 
which could jeopardise that part of their living which they 
derive from fees in private practice 11 • (ll
2 ) 
The Southern Cross Medical Care Society , in their submissions to 
the Board of Health Committee on Private Hospitals, report on a 
survey that they conducted among a number of surgeons in 
Auckland in 1970. "It showed that while, 01. average, they gave 
almost half of their working time to Public Hospital service , 
the re~Jards from that work accounted for only 20% of their 
income , the other 80% comin.g from private practice undertaken 
during the remainder of their time . "(llJ) Given the trends in 
the number of people taking out voluntary health insurance there 
is no reason. to doubt that the situation has changed at all . 
It is understandable therefore that many in the medical 
profession were disappoin.ted ivhen the Accident Compensation 
Commission would not agree to accept automatic liability for 
the payment of private hospital treatment under section 111 , 
s i nce this would have meant a higher income from increased 
number of patients entering private hospitals . Generally 
s peaking though , it is fair to say that the majority ofthe 
medical p r ofession has accepted the Commission's attitude and 
the policy guidelines set out in the Medical Handbook . 
( 112 ) 
( 11 J) 
R . J . Latimer , Health Administration in New Zealand 
( 196 9 ) p . 11. 
Southern Cross Medical Care Society, Submissions t o the 
Board of Health Inquiry into Private Hospitals . 1 972 
(mimeo.) p . 8 . 
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Howeve r in some instances particular doctor and specialists have 
persisted in admitting their patients to a private hospital 
without obtaining the prior approval of the Commission, while 
still expecting the Commission to meet the costs of such 
treatment. This has been one of the main reasons for the high 
number of Review Hearings in this area. 
The more extreme attitude is illustrated by a classic piece of 
. d . . t R . H . (114) evi ence given in a recen eview _earing. In this case the 
consultant surgeon concerned, question by the Hearing Officer as 
to why the patient had been admitted to a private instead of a 
public hospital, said: 
It didn't occ ur to me in any way. In the course of 24 years 
practice in t his to wn as a surgeon I have not once referred 
a patient to the Public Hospital Outpatient Cli nic and I 
have no intentio n of ever so doing 
I've been in practice i n this town here for 24 years. It 
has a population of 39,000. My practice is known to every-
body in this town. It is a private practice. Everybody 
who comes to my rooms pays a fee: that fee is my livelihood. 
If surgery is required they have that surgery in a private 
hospital for which there is a :ee. Everybody in this to wn 
knows this ... 
I will send the patient to a private hospital because 
there I charge him a fee and that fee constitutes my 
livelihood. I shouldn't have to state this. This is self-
evident. The qu.estion in the correspondence: 'Why did I 
send the patient to a private hospital?' is a silly 
question 
The patient was injured at work and attended my rooms. 
And if he did this again tomorrow he would have this done 
(114) Review Hearing No 76/R0404. 
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in a private hospital. If he said to me he wanted it 
done in a way i n which I was not going to be in receipt 
of a fee I would take exception to his having come to 
my rooms. Because he knows perfectly well that I 
expect to charge him a fee. 
Fortunately, not too many in the medical profession display such 
Li.nyielding affections but there are 11 problem 11 practitioners who 
appear to be doing their best to thwart the Commi ssion 1 s policy 
in this area. An interesting example concerns an orthopaedic 
surgeon (a Mr G of Palmerston North) who has been involved in 
at least five Review Hearings(llS) out of the fifty or so 
indexed on the Commission 1 s files. In each case Mr G has 
neglected to obtai n the Commission 1 s approval prior to admitting 
the patient into a private hospital although in most of the 
cases it would have been possible for him to seek this approval. 
In each case Mr G has made a similar argument in support of his 
claim. His contention is that while suitable treatment has 
been available in the public hospital, there would have been no 
guarantee that he would have been able to conduct the operation 
in the public hospital. He has stressed the desirability of 
the initial surgeon seeing the treatment through and the fact 
that it would be unethical to delegate treatment to some other 
person after having accepted responsibility himself for proper 
treatment to be given. On some occasions it has even been 
suggested that the staff available at the public hospital might 
not be competent enough to treat the particular injury. (ll 6 ) 
At the Review Hearings the Commission has agreed to pay the costs 
involved in four of these cases. In two cases it has found that 
(115) Review Hearings: No 74/ROOJJ4; No 74/ROOJl?; No 75/R0062; 
No 75/ROJ08; No 75/R0912. 
( 116) Review Hearing No 75/Roo62. 
75/R0671, 
see also Review Hearing No 
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of the patient(ll?) but in the other two cases the Commission 
has paid the costs reluctantly, considering that the surgeon 
in effect has presented it with a fait accompli. (ll 8 ) In the ------
fifth case(ll 9 ) the Commission flatly refused to meet the 
costs for private hospital treatment. As the Hearing Officer 
in that casesaid: 
After two and a half years of experience in Accident 
Compensation the view is taken that the orthopaedic 
surgeon should have knoc,,m that discussion tl/i th the 
Commission was necessary and this he failed to do. 
The difficulty which the Commission faced in these cases was 
that more often than not no indication had been given by the 
surgeon to the patient that he might be liable for the private 
hospital expenses himself if theCommission's prior approval was 
not obtained. As has already been seen, the Commission has 
been reluctant to have such costs fall on the patient if it 
would result in economic hardship, which it invariably would. 
Whether this last decision has resulted in a change of attitude 
by Mr G remains to be seen but it does indicate that the 
Commission might be prepared, in the future, to decline liability 
for the costs of private hospital treatment in order to bring 
the reality of the Commission's policy home to doctors and 
surgeons who have a duty to inform their patients of the 
financial implications of entering private hospitals without 
prior approval having been obtained. 
(117) Review Hearings: No 75/R0062; No 75/ROJ08. 
(118) Review Hearings: No 74/ROOJJ4; No 74/ROOJl?. 
(119) Review Hearing No 75/R0912. 
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A recent Appeal Authority decision does indicate that the 
Commissio n's approach to the problem will be stricter in the 
future and that the doctor's responsibility to his patient will 
be more stringen-cly enforced . Re New( 120 ) involved the question 
of payment for private hospital treatment for an operation on 
a child who had fractured hel' nasal bones in an accident at 
school. Blair J. found that prior approval for private hospital 
treatmen.t had not been given an.d that admission to the private 
hospital had been made at t he initiation of the surgeon . 
There was evidence that proper treatment was available at a 
nearby public hospital without delay. The appeal was dismissed 
by the learned Judge, who said: (l 2 l ) 
... I feel obliged to comment that if the surgeon had had 
regard to the Handbook the parents of the child may not 
have been made liable for these hospital and surgical 
expenses as it is plain that there was no obstacle to the 
child being treated in the public hospital system. This 
case , and other cases that have come before me have 
demonstrated that the medical profession has a particular 
respo ns ibili ty in accident cases to ensure that the 
patient fully un.derstands the financial implications of 
a recommendation by the doctor that the patient enter a 
private hospital with its a ttendant costs . If adequate 
public hospital facilities are ava ilable the patient 
should be so informed and advised that if in these 
circumstances he elects to go to t he pri va te hospital 
the n the consequent hospital and medical costs will be the 
patient's responsibility . In the usual pre -ope r a tion 
stage a p at i ent is usually heavi l y dependent upon his 
doctor's advice and this gives an added responsibility 
to the latter to ensure that the alternatives are fully 
explained . 
(1 20 ) Re Ne1·J (1 976 ) 1 N. Z . A. R . 1 64 ; Acc ide nt Comp ensation Appeal 
Authority Dec isio n No 1J . 
(1 2 1) ibi d 166. 
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After offering these words of warning to the medical profession 
Blair J . suggests: (122 ) 
To avoid any misunderstanding between doctor and patient 
and for the doctor 1 s protection in cases where the 
patient selects private hospital treatment in circumstances 
where public hosp ital treatment is available, it s eems 
to me that it vrnuld be prudent for the doctor to ask the 
patient to sign a wr itte n form of consent which shows 
that the patient has been properly advised on the point 
and has elected to bear the cost of private hospital 
treatment . 
As one commentator has said, this suggestion by Blair J. 
11 clearly implies that in. his opinion the expanding liability 
in. tort for negligent advice may well encompass the situation 
with which he was dealing" . (l 2J) 
Auckland Geriatric Cases 
In 1974 the Health Department was transferring patients from the 
public to private hospitals and paying the costs of treatment 
of the patients transferred in three instances: (l 24 ) 
(1) A Rest Home Scheme sponsored by the Health Department in 
Auckla nd and Chris tchurch under which age beneficiaries 
were transferred from public hospitals to private 
hospitals because the public hospitals needed the 
accomodatio n . 
(1 22 ) 
(12J) 
idem. 
G. W. Palmer, 11 Accident Compensation and Private Hospitals" 
(1977) N . Z .L.J. 50 , 5J . 
(1 24) The Health Department considered that it was able to do 
this under section 78 of t he Hospitals Act 1957. 
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(2) A scheme, approved by Government , under ··111ich public 
hospitals were able to contract for beds in private 
hospitals . (l 2S) 
(J ) The Otago Hospital Board was transferring certain geriatric 
patie nts to a maternity hospital to relieve pressure on 
the acute wards . 
In all of these cases the Hospital Boards were pay ing to the 
private hospitals concerned the difference between the Social 
We lfare benefits paid in respect of the patients and the cost 
of the treatment in t'1e private hospital . 
The Auckland Hospital Board was also in the practice of 
discharging geriatric and destitute patients i~_to private 
~ospital s for convalescence . The Board applied a means test 
to determine ~ihether the patients could pay the private hospital 
costs and if not the 3oard paid them. 
It appears that in the Auckland area elderly accident patients 
were being dis cr i mi~ated against in two ways : First , if 
possible, a public hospital would avoid taking in these patients; 
secondly , when the public hospitals did admit these patients 
they kept them i n for only a fract io n of the time for which the 
injury r e quired hospitalisation, and discharged them into a 
private hospital as quick l y as possible. The purpose behind 
these practices was to prevent the public hospitals from 
i nher iting lo ngstanding geriatric cases , in view of the 
probabi lity that with e ld erly people an accident could lead to 
the necessity for hosp ital treatment for t he rest of their lives. 
(125 ) This scheme was not fully operat ional at the time but 
Wellington Hospital did have a contract with Calvary 
Hospital for the use of 26 beds while reoai rs were 
done to one of the Wellington Hospital w~rds . 
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The Accident Compensation Commission Lvas naturally concerned that 
these practices were occurri ng . If an elderly patient was not 
admitted to a public hospital, he or she would probably go to a 
private hospital and, subject to the Commissio ~ 's discretion as 
to reasonableness , the Commission tvould be liasle for private 
hospital fees under section 111 . Similarly, if an elderly 
patient was discharged into a private hospital long before a 
normal patient suffering from similar injuries would have been 
sent home, and the public hospital did not s ubsid ise the private 
hospital fees, the Commission could again be liable. 
3ecause of the Commission. 's liability under section 111 therefore, 
the coming into force of the Accident Compensat~on Act presented 
the Hospital Board with the opportunity to s hift the financial 
responsibility from the State health services to the Co mmission. 
The disturbing aspect for the Commission so far as the transfer 
of patients from the public to private hospitals was concerned, 
was that the public hospitals were not asking themselves when 
ac cident treatment ended and geriatric care began . Because 
the patients were being discharged while they Mere still 
accident patients a claim against the Commissio n could be supported , 
and once the Commission accepted responsibili ty for the cost 
of maintaining an aged accident victim in a private hospital, 
it could have been. impossible to assess when accident treatment 
end ed and geriatric care began. Consequently , t he Commission 
could have ended up paying hospital fees for a1 extended period . 
The Commission thought it unacceptable that this shifting of 
financial responsibility could depend on any of a number of 
factors influencing a Medical Superintendent of a hospital to 
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discharge an accident patient, and considered that there 
should be some other, more reliable, dividing point between 
State health financial responsibility and the Commission's 
financial responsibility. 
In an Internal Memorandum issued in February 1975, the Commissio n 
proposed that, (apart from the services of private medical 
practitioners outside institutions), the State health services 
retain financial responsibility for institutional costs, and 
costs of medical treatment, for accident victims up to and 
until th~ time was reached when medical-cure treatment could no 
longer offer any reasonable prospect of further recovery or 
cure. At that point the responsibility of the State health 
s·ervices would cease, apart from such services as were available 
in the nature of District Health Nurses, or other standard 
public health practices. 
From that time onwards the Commission would accept responsibility 
under section 121 (J) for the cost of institutional care of a 
person whose injuries by accident had left that person with such 
a disability that he could not reasonably return to his living 
environment prior to the accident or if for some other reason 
the disability justified institutional care. 
The effect of this proposal was that the S~ate remained 
financially responsible so long as medical-cure treatment was 
still underway; but once a chronic state was reached, which 
medical treatment could no longer improve, and institutional 
care was required, the Commission would become responsible. 
Consequently, the prevailing reasons why an accident victim 
was discharged from public hospital , and transferred to the 
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private sector would be irrelevant. 
The Auckland Hospital 3oard however continued to deny liability 
for private hospital fees in this type of situation on the basis 
that once the patients had been discharged fro m the Board ' s 
hospital into a private hospital it was incumbent on the 
Commission to pay the fees under section 111, and therefore the 
Board had no further financial responsibility for them. It also 
argued that the adjustment made by the Health Department to the 
Board's financial allocation with the coming in.to force of the 
Accident Compensation Act did not cover geriatric cases . 
Inquiries directed by the Commission to the Hospitals Division of 
the Health Department revealed that the adjust men t ITBde by the 
Department to the Board I s financial allocatio'.l lvas to cover the 
Board 1 s loss of reven ue from accidents . However under the 
Department I s Rest Home Scheme the Board was provided with funds 
to be used in paying private hospital fees for geriatrics 
transferred and the indications were that these funds should 
have been sufficient to pay for private hospital treatment of 
geriatric accident victims without any recourse being made to 
the Commission. 
Faced with this situ.ation, the Commission issued another Memorandum 
in September 1975 outlining a set of principles to be applied in 
all cases except those where special circumstances existed or 
where the principles could not be exactly applied . These 
principles were to be applied only in the Auckland Hospital 
3oard area , and they- were to remain in force until agreement 
i·Jas reached with the Board . Apparently no agreement has been 
reached and this policy represents the Commission ' s present 
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attitude to the 11 Auckland geriatric cases 11 • 
The principles laid doivn to a large degree implemented the 
proposals which had been put forward in the earlier memorandum 
although there were some modifications. The most significant 
parts of the memorandum are as follows: 
The Commission will accept payment of private hospital, 
rest home, convalescent home etc. charges by payment 
either to the hospital or by refund to the claimant, 
where the claimant has been transferred direct from 
public hospital, under the follm11ing conditions: 
2. Acute treatment, a nd attentio n or supervision by a 
specialist, must ha ve finished, so that in the 
private hospital t he only attention required is 
that which ca n be given by t he hospital no~-
professional staff or by a general pra ctitioner. 
If further specialist attention is contemplated, 
liability will not be accepted but the circumstances 
will be considered and a decision made on the facts 
of the particular case. 
J. Establish that it is not reasonably practicable, 
in all the circumstances, for the patient to 
return to his former residence from the public 
hospital instead of going to the private hospital. 
The previous condition of health of the claimant, 
the domestic circumstances in the residence, the 
extent of nursing or other care required, and the 
mobility and severity of the injuries of the 
claimant are all relevant factors. 
4. Payments will continue only so long as the patient 
remains incapacitated or disabled as a result of 
the personal injury by accident. Ca ses will 
require periodic review, so that payments will 
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cease if the patie:1t returns to the same state of 
health as he would have been in but for the accident , 
even though he remain in the private hospital for 
other reasons . 
It is significant to note here that the memorandum also authorised 
a scrutiny of all relevant claim files and revisions to be made in 
accordance with these principles in order that there would be no 
discrimination between claimants who had applied for Review in 
respect of the Commission 1 s refusal to pay for the private 
hospital treatment following direct transfer fro~ public hospital, 
and those who had not . 
It is interesti ng to observe how the Commissio :1. dealt 1vith this 
specific problem . Obviously , it was not a sit uati o n which could 
be resolved by the application of the policy considerations s et 
out in the Medical Handbook . The Auckland Hospital Board was in 
effect presenting the Commission with a fai t accompli over the 
payment of private hospital fees for elderly accident victims . 
If both the Hospital Board and the Commissio n refused to accept 
liability for such costs, the patients thems elves , by no design 
on their own part, would have to pay them . As has already been 
indicated , the Commission has been reluctant to see this 
situation develop, and therefore usually agreed to pay the costs 
because of the special circumstances involved in these cases. 
The Commission however saw the danger that , if liability was 
accep ted in the geriatric area , the Hospital Boards might extend 
the practice to accident victims generally . The Commission 's 
fears may have been well fou nde d if the evidence produced in a 
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R · H . (1 26 ) . - .c. 1975 . . d . . ev1ew ear1ng 1n J_al,e 1s any 1n 1cat1on . In that 
case , the applicant , in support of his claim that the Commission 
meet the costs of private medical treatment , produced two 
letters s ent to him by the Medical Superintendent i n charge 
of the waiting l ist for t he North Canterbury Hospital Board . 
The first letter read : 
In my opinion patients who cannot have their surgery in 
private are the patients who receive priority as far as 
the Publ i c Hospital System is concerned . In ·other words , 
had I been asked to give a ruling on your particular 
case I wou l d have said you did not warrant priority 
because as your hernia developed as a resul t of an 
accident, you could at least in theory had obtained 
surgery i n private . 
And the Superintendent is even more to t he point in his next 
letter : 
I do not g i ve priority to Acc i dent Compensation cases on 
the routine surgical waiting list . On the contrary , I 
adopt the attitude that patients who c o uld have their 
s urgery in private hospitals should not have elective 
s urgery in a public institution except in cases of 
emergency . If Accident Compensation cases are operated 
on i n pub l ic hospitals , patients who have no option 
must be deferred . 
Obvi ously , therefore it was essen.tial that the Commission firml y 
establish its attitude t o the payment of private hosp i tal fees 
in these cases . According to one of the Commiss i on ' s Hear i ng 
Officers, t he pr i nciples l aid down in the memorandum are work i ng 
in practice to t he satisfaction of all parties concerned and 
for the present time at l east the problem appears t o have been 
reso l ved . 
(126 ) Review Hearing No 75/R0462 . 
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It is suggested by way of conclusion however that the type of 
situation which arose here might very well have been the type 
of situation which could have been better resolved by the 
Governor-General in Council exercising his po:1Jer to make 
regulations under section 181 . This was not a situation in 
which the Commission needed a flexible policy making procedure, 
it was situation which demanded a definite i ndicatiot1 of which 
of two statutory bodies was liable for certain expenses i n a 
particular sit uation . As it was the dispute between the 
Commission and the Auck l and Hospital Board contir1ued for a lmost 
eighteen months before it was resolved and , it is submitted, a 
more satisfactory solution would have been achieved if 
Regulations had been. brought doc·m un.der sectio:1 181 to regula te 
the situation which existed . 
VII . CONCLUSION 
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l'he scheme of the Accident Compensation Act rests on the tripod 
of prevention of accidents, rehabilitation, a~d compensation. 
Given that the focus of the rehabilitation aspect of the Act 
is on the role of the hospital, supported by the medical 
profession, it was to be expected that the Act would reflect the 
nature of New Zealand 1 s hospital system by imposing a liability 
on the Commission for the costs of treatment obtained in a 
private hospital, if the costs of treatment were to be covered 
at all. The Act does impose that liability subject to the 
Commission 1 s discretion as to whether "the amount to be paid by 
it is reasonable by New Zealand 's standards''. This paper has 
been primarily co!'.lcerned with the narrow question of how the 
Commission has exercised that discretion. 
It has been useful to examine the Commissio n 's policy in this area 
both at the general level a~d at the more specific level. At 
the general level, it has shown how the Commissio n , which has 
only been in existence for five years, has developed a general 
policy which it applies in the exercise of its discretion. In 
formulating this policy the Commission has had to make judgments 
on how best to utilise the country's health facilities and, 
iron.i cally, in. determining in what circumstances it would be 
preferable to make use of private hospitals, the Commission has 
had to take into account problems existing in the public sector 
which to a large extent have been caused by the perpetration of 
a dual hospital system. 
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In exercising its discretion, the Commission has found it 
necessary to balance many factors and the paper has shown that 
in instances where the general policy, as set out in the 
Medical Handbook , has not been. able to satisfactorily resolve 
a particular situation which has arisen, the Commission has 
been willing and able to adapt or modify its policy to meet 
the particular contingency. 
On a more specific level , the examination has shown how the 
Commission as an administrative body , has had to interact and 
operate alongside other people and organisations in the communi t~-
a t large . Quite apart from the fact that the Commission. , by the 
very ·nature of its statu.tory functions, has to deal with the 
persons who have a claim u.nder the Act, it has not been able to 
develop a policy and exercise its discretion in IBolation. It 
has had to take account of the operations and views of su.ch 
organisations as the Social Security Department , the Hospital 
Boards , the medical profession and the private medical insurance 
societies, who are also intimately involved with the successful 
operation of the Act . 
The l arge number of Review Hearings in this area appears to have 
been the result of a "feeling out 11 of the Commission ' s policy 
by the various parties concerned . The Commission indicates that 
the number of s uch applications over the past nine months has 
dropped to a more realistic level and it is suggested that this 
is because the policy is becoming more widely known by those 
who were ignorant of it previou.sly and is being adhered to more 
closely by those who chose to turn a "blind-eye" to it 
previously . Related to this trend , of course , is the fact that 
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the policy has gained a large measure of support in the decisions 
of the Appeal Authority. 
In conclus io n , it is s ubmit ted that the Commission 's policy in 
thi s area is a so und and s ens ible one, providi :ig genuine relief 
fo r those who have valid gro unds for entering private hospital 
whi le, at the same time, ensuring that the role of the private 
sec tor in Accident Co rnpe nsa t ion does not reach uni nte n.ded 
proportions. 
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PRIVATE HOSP\TALS - POLl[Y 
11 Feln: unry i97S 
I attach some notes on the difficult question of transfer of patients from public hospital::, i".(l :rr.st homen 1 convalescent homes or privnte hospitals. 
Wo uld Divisions listed below plea~o offer comm8nts by 
28 __ [_~?.r~ary 1975. 
f~ • L • S a n d f o r d 
Chairman · 
Dist ribution 
'- ..... ·~ ,• 
Ch.i_ef Solicitor 
Director of Compensation 
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Private Hospital und Rest llo r.ies - Commission Pol icy 
1. It. i~ suggestE~d ~hat. corr~ideration be given to the follo1.,Jing 
poin l,s when cons1dor1ng t:he proposed regulations un d~r. section ·j 11, 
2, Go ve~nment policy agreed that Government funds (th r ough the 
Hosp ital system) should pay for. the public hosnita1· treatment 
o f · a c c i de n t . v i c t i m s • Th i s e x t 1· a c u s t 1., o t h o ho s p i t a 1 s y s t em 
_(com pn~ed w~th the recoveri es they previously made from insurance 
companies) is larg e ly balanced by tho saving to Gnvarnment funds 
a s ~ r e ~ u 1 t ~ f t h e Comm i s s i o n no t,J r-1 cl y i n ~1 f o r w ha t p r o v i o us l y t h e 
Soc i~~ Security. Oepartmc11t paid uul .in sickrie~,:, arid invalidity 
bsnsr 1 ts to accidentally injured !J eople, 
3. It can therefore be assumod thai... () t.'aving Lts.i cfo pri.11c::ltc rncdicaJ 
pract itioner treatm e nt) the cost of medical-cure treatment of 
a c c i d e n t v i c t i ms . i s t h e r e s p o r1 s i h .i. J i t y o f t h e St at e h ea l t h s e r v i c O s 
and not that of th e Co mmission. · 
4, It is una ccEJ pt 8ble that the shifting of f .inanr,iaJ responsibility 
b e tu e e n t h e St at e he al t h s 8 r v i c :J ~:; ( t I , c µ u b 1 i c Ii o s p i. t u 1 s ) a n d t h c 
Com rn i s s ion can depend on the uh j_ n, u f , o r pre v a i 1 i n ~l cir cums tan c e s 
affecti ng, a f'le dical SupBri ntc11ric·r1t of a hosri tal. Th ere might bo 
any of a. numb er of factors irifluEn1c.i llCJ a f·ledic<1J. SupPr.i11trn1dent 
to discharge an accident patient. The mome11t of di~charge fror;: 
publ ic ho spitals surely cannot rcpresont the divirli11g point b2tLJG8f1 
State h ea lth fin ancial responsitJility and the Cun1rni0sion. Th ere 
s ho u l d b e so me o t h s r mu r c r e U. a h .-1 r ! d j v _i_ ci .i. 1 : D rw i. 11 t. 
5. It is propo sed th at ( apar t frorn thB" sorv icEJ s of · private medical 
pra6titi oner s outsid e institutions) the Stat e health services 
retai n financial r esponsibility for institutional costs? and co sts 
of modical tre atmont i for accident v ictims up to and until tl10 
tima is re ac h e d 1.,1hon modical-cure trec1tmGnt can no lon g0 r offe r any 
reasonable prospect o f further recovery or cure. As at th n t 
poi nt the responsibility of ths State h ealth serv.i.c8S shuu ld ceo.se, 
a p a r t f r o m s u c h s e r v i c e s a s a r e ciV a i .l_ n b J (~ i n t h e ri a t. u I' r. o f 
Dist rict Health Nurses , or other standard public h Balt h practices • . 
6 . F r o m t h a t t i rn e o nLJ c1 r d s t h e C o mm i s s i u n i.:J i J. l a c L; •:: p t r e s r, ons i b i 1 i t y ~ 
uncio r section 121(J) for the cost of institutional cara of a 
p e r so n t..1 ho s a i n j t J r i e s b y a c c i do n t ha v e l o f t t h n t p a r so n u i t h s u c h 
a disability that h o cannot roa~)Oflc:!b1y return to his living 
e n v i r u 1-1 me n t p r i o r t o t h P. a c c i d e 11 t o r ~ f f o r o t h ~ r . p r op er . r ? a so n . 
t h 8 d j. s a bi J.:i_ t y j LI s t if i e s ins U . t ll l._i (J: I a. l C EH 8 0 r h ls p 1' rll/l s l On lJC, u l 0 
mean that geriatric patients, left uith a chronic ir_r.opara.bl~ . 
fract ur e, and for whom the doctors can do n o rnoro , uill be mainbnned 
i n g e r i a t r i c .i. n s t i t u _t i o n s a t C o mm .i ~, f3 i o n e x f1 o r-: s o • 
7. The same rule cuul d apply to tr2 11sfcrs from public ho:Jµitc1ls -Lo 
uthcr rost h or;ics and to private hospitals. Th e State remc"ii11s 
fin c:rnc:i,.dJy rc::;po11sibJ.e SCl 1DIHJ a~ rnedica l-:- cure trsatr.,en'~ is . 
s 1: i 11 u nu 8 r u a y ; Liu t on c o n c h r o rn. c s ~ate . 1 s ~ ~a c h 8 d , 1.,1 h: c h me d :· c a 1 
lr 8 atmont c ~n no l ongu~ j_1nprnv A, and 1nst1tut1onal care 1s re quired > 
Urn [ornfllission uiJ.1 bccor.ib r o~ ponsible. 
I 
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8. Provisions such as the abovo wil} make it irrolevant uhat were the prevailing ro2sons why an accident victim is clisr:iiurged from public hospital treatment, and transferred (either uith or without the pati8nt's consent) to 3 rest hCJmc i convc1lescent lionie, geriatric hospital, or private hospih:tl. Tllo Commission will not be concerned . . But it will mbve in to pick up the finan c ial responsibility at such a point as jnstitutional caro is still r e q u i r e d , b u t m e d i c a 1 - c u r e t r e at nm r 1 t c a n do no m o r e • 
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ACCIDENT COMPENSATION COMiv.lSSION 
MEMORANDUM FROM CHAIRMAN 
8 Se ptember 1975 
DIRECTO R OF COMPENSATION 
REVIE l.J & APPEAL SECTION 
AUCKLAND GERIATRIC CASES 
So t hat there will be no discrimination between claimants who hav e or have not, applied for Revi ew in respect of the Commission's ' refusa l to pay for private hospit al treatment following direct tr ans fer f rom pu blic hospital, a scrutiny is to be made of all the relevant claim files and revisions . made in accordance with the follow ing 
princi ples. 
Th es e principles will apply to the majority of cases . There will be othe r cases of special circumstanc e s, or to 0hich the principles canno t be exactly applied. These should be individually considered . 
Th es e principles will apply in the meantime only to the Auckland Hosp ital Board area, and will continue in forc e until agreeme nt is re ac hed with the Auckland Hospital Board on future cases. 
The Commission will accept payment of private ho spita l, resthome, convalescent home, etc •. charges by payment either to the hospital or by refund to the claimant, where the claimant has been tr ansfe r direct from public hospital, under the follow ing conditions: 
1. Establish that case is one accepted as personal injury by 
accident covered by th e Act. 
2. Acute treatment, and attention or supervision by a specialist, must have finished, so that in the private hospital the only attention required is that which can be given by the ho spi tal , non-professional staff or by a general practitioner. If further specialist attention is contemplated, liability will not be accepted but the circumstances will be considered and a decision made on the facts of the · particular case. 
3. Establish that it is not reasonably practicable, in all the circumstances for the patient to return to his former reside, from the public hospital instead of going to the privat~ hospital. The previous condition of hea lth of the claimant, the domestic circumstances in the residence , the extent of _nursing or other care required, and the mobility and severity of the injuries of the claimant are all relevant factors. 
4. · Payments will continue only so long as the pa~ient rem~i~s incapacitated or disabl e d as a result of the personal inJury by accident. Cases will require periodic review, so that payments will cease if the patient returns to the same state of health as he would have been in but for the accident, even 
/ 0 
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though h e remain in the private hospital for othGr rGasons. 
5 .. Payment is only in respect of the private hospital's account 
in excess of the social security patient benefit. 
6 . Refunds can be made to relatives who, by production of receipts 
or otherwise, demonstrate that they have provided the 8oney. 
7. After refun~s h ave been made the future accounts from the 
hospital can be rendered to the Commission. 
B. If the patient is still receiving "tr eatment of lhe person 2 s 
a patient in an y hospital" in respect of his accident injuries 
(section 111(2)(a)) the payment is made for medical treatment 
under section 111. For this purpose "tr eatment " includes 
hospital attention (not necessarily only from medical 
practitioners) that is designed: 
9. 
1 0. 
(a) To cure or reduce the injury. 
(b) To rehabilitate a patient in respect of his accident 
injuries. 
(c) To maintain a patient's condition which would, but for 
such attention, deteriorate further as a result of the 
injury. 
lJhen "treatment" in any of those senses is no longer being 
supplied the case ceases to come under section 111, and payment 
under that section will then cease. 
If, after "treatment" under section 111 ceases, the patient 
must still r ecei ve "constant personal attention" in respect of 
"necessary care" - and this attention and care is still the 
result of the personal injury by accident, the case transfers 
to one requiring consideration under section 121(3). But the 
Commission has a discretion as to whether it will make payment: 
under this section, and (if it does·) the amoun t thereof. 
Reductions: 
(a) Payments made under section 111 will, in the case of a 
Supplementary Fund claimant, continue to be paid in full. 
If, however, the claimant is in receipt of earnings relate , 
compensation, payments will continue in full for three 
months, but the file will then be referred to the Corn11issi 
for consideration of whether a reduction will be made unde 
section 129. 
(b) If a case becomes one of "constant pers onal attention" 
under section 121(3) it will be referred to the Commi : ion 
to be considered in the light of its own circumstance s . 
In general it is to be expected that the saving to the 
claimant of living costs will be reflected by his maki rig 
a contribution from his own resources (not exceeding one-
half of his pension) with the Commission paying the b u tane 
Care will be required to ensure that the "constant per- ~ona 
attention" is required for the personal injuries by accide 
and not from reasons . solely connected w·i th age, infirmity, 
etc., which might have beer1 applicable if no accident had 
occurred. 
I 
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11. Some geriatric patients are returned, either direct from 
public ho spita l, or by way of a private hospital, to a n 
institution wh ere they had formerly lived, e .g., old peoples 
homes. Some of these institutions have a hospital wing. 
Even though a patient might formerly have been paying for 
accommodatio n in the home, admissio n to the hospital wing 
for either sectio n 111 "tr eatment " or sectio n 121 "constant 
personal attention" will still be dealt with under the above 
principles. However, in respect of section 121 cases, the 
amount that the claimant would in any event have been paying 
to the institution will be considered a relevant factor in 
deciding what contribution (if any) he should make towards 
the cost of the "constant personal attentio n". 
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PTU\'1\ T t::; H0:'31> .. LTAL ClJ,\.llli-1:> - PAYilL ~i'~ J' O} .'c ·!OL: \ T:::i L~SS THAN THE COST::. 
ACTTJ,\.LLY INCUTUIBI.> 
Tho Appoal Anthori ty in i ssu.i. .ng it::; dcci.sion in an appeal by 
E .D. Turncr,relating to payment o :r Private }h.1spital expenses , 
cuni:ncntcd to the c[i'.-ct L.hQt section 111 of the .Accident 
Compensation Act c 1111.i.'urs a discretionary power on the · 
Commission to determine to ·wl12. t extent ( if cmy ) .. it ·will accept 
financial responsibili ty for private hospi tal treatment. 
In determining that ques tion, the Appeal Authority reco gnised 
the proprj_ety of the guidelines sot out in Chapter 7 of the 
Co mmission's Medical Hanc!lJook to determine whether th1c~re arc 
any circumstances pres e n t in a particular case which would 
justify admission to a p rivate hospitat so as to require thu 
Commission to make :full paymen t ,)f', or a c OH ~ribut ion towetr ;..i s, 
the cost ol' priv::ite hospital troatrnent. 
I.f the claim is not ,,holly 111eri torious , but }irovj_ded there ar~· 
circumst ance s pr0 sent whi ch sho,,' so inc justi.:fication :for ol)tain -
ine; trca tmen t in ,l private ho spit~, 1 , the- Cc,rnn1i s sion rnay pay 
part u.f the cost o:f that treatment . 
In considering the circum s Lance:-, ul~ 03.cr, c ase , the Appeal, 
Authority sta t ed the Comrni;-;sion ,1 , .. 1:., Pni; j tl -·d to l ook c.tt the 
general structure of medi c:Ll services ir No w Zealand and to 
ask itself whether lt is reaso n able by }ew Zeal and standards 
that it should pay priva-cu hospito.l cllareet; with their associated specialist ree ·s , t aking in to acc,Junt tha~ f'J'ref-~n hospit;;i.l nnd 
medical service is avail a ble 1..ntclur the S·>ci;1l Security Act ·196/;.. 
For the assistance o:f s ta:f:'.f hand l:i..ng Private 1lo s pi ta l clain1s 
the C omm5.ss ion h as issued t.hc f'o lloving bread c;-uiclclines; -
Normal Comm-is s i on policy will c u.n-cj 1 .. 10 -co be tha i.; , after 
consideration o:f the :t' ac tors se ·L ou r, in clw Mod i..cal Ha11db ook 
the cost of private hospit a l treatment w ill be oither acceptctl 
in f'ull, or not acc epted at; all . in oth2r words the Commission belleves that, in almost every caso, it ~ ~ impossible to place 
a p ercentage ,)n the l eve l of meri 't and 8.<:co; ' di.ngly p a y that 
percentage in cash. 
Howevur, there wil l li e ::;u1nc ca:-s~:-s in ,-:hi,·11 ,; c 111u s t lie pri..::p c.:.rcd 
eithor on our 01-·n initiat:iv<: or a~; :1 rc!:-iult ,) f r L~ prcslJnta·tion.::o , 
-co off'cr a conLci ·uution t,)\,r;:.ird::-; LhL' cos t uJ.' Lrcal;nc}nt . 
Co1ct /u .•. 
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v.'j th ~P('Cj_;:i l C' Xccpl.ion~ c(,nl.ribution:- s J1 , :Jc! be considrrcd 
:1.. 11 the l';:Jt1ge oJ' 'JI)'.·, , h(,-;:~ or 7y;;, . Grc;:itcr or l0~s pcrc c ntaE,es c1o not. s0em t(, lli nkc $Pn:~0 . If' onC' -Llli.nk:c= in t0rms or .Less than .'SO;,; contriL>11ti0n, jt, i_s prob;:iblP U12t the ci_rcul!lsta.nces do not, po:5scss rn.o,! f~ h mcrj i. Lu j11s Li r y ony cori tribt1i..j on nt ;:i.i.l. . On the otlJc'r li;ind. if Lhc cil'c1nnst.nnccs sugiC7csL more t han 7-y;b it i::: c .L8 :1 r t . t, ;-,t_; tlie me rit co11sirJerr1.tions are so :=;tro n t:;- as to ,]llf:.tii'y !.ot:ul p nyrnenL. 
(cl) Arrangements to rncike pc1y111011ts by w:iy o:f contribution should be cntcrrd into onl y in rare cases, and pressure on thc::- Commission to make 1;hat a regular practice s h ould be resisted. 
( e) It is emphas .ised that it wiJ_l be only in_ rare c ase s claims will be dealt wi t h in this wa y and under no circumstances during the hnndling o~ the claim should fue claimant 
be led to believe that the Cornmis sion will as a ma tter of course consider mee ting a proportion o:f t he claim. 
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